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Articles
MARK L. ADAMS*
Fear of Foreigners: Nativism and
Workplace Language Restrictions
[AIll of our people all over the country, all except the pure-
blooded Indians, are immigrants or descendants of immigrants,
including even those who came over here on the Mayflower.
-President Franklin D. Roosevelt1
Everyone should speak English or just shut up, that's what I
say.
-Calvin, Calvin and Hobbes2
The workplace has emerged as the primary battleground of the
official English movement and the civil rights of language minori-
ties.' In recent years, the number of "speak English only" rules
in the workplace has sharply increased.4 As of June, 1994, the
EEOC had approximately 120 active charges against 67 different
employers who had imposed English-only rules.' While some of
* Assistant Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law; J.D. 1988, University
of Chicago Law School; B.A. 1983, Williams College. The author thanks his faculty
colleagues for their insightful suggestions; law librarians Warren Rees and Sally
Holterhoff for their research assistance; his father, Walter L. Adams, for his legal
expertise; and Melissa and Ingrid for their support. This article is dedicated to the
memory of my grandparents and Rose Mary Kelly Condon.
1 Text of Roosevelt's Final Campaign Address in Boston, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1944,
at 38.
2 Cartoon by Bill Watterson, Sept. 5, 1989 (United Press Syndicate 1989).
3 Aileen Maria Ugalde, "No Se Habla Espanol": English-Only Rules in the Work-
place, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1209, 1233 (1990).
4 Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken
Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293, 303 (1989) (attributing the rise in complaints
about the rules to passage of California's official English amendment); Rob Gurwitt,
English-Only Campaign Is Spreading, GOVERNING, Aug. 1988, at 67.
5 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
15, Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2726 (1994). For example, Chinese-American employees of a Los Angeles insurance
[849]
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these rules are promulgated to promote worker safety, many are
a response to the xenophobia of the official English movement
and fear of employer sanctions under the Immigration Reform
and Control Act ("IRCA").6
The controversy surrounding English-only rules in the world of
employment, and the resultant litigation, can be understood only
when examined from a historical perspective. The official English
movement has been a reaction to the perceived threat from the
increase in immigrants, principally Hispanic immigrants, and
anti-immigrant sentiment has dramatically increased in recent
years.7 The perceived threat does not involve the English lan-
guage, however, but rather the political concerns caused by un-
wanted foreigners.8 These concerns result in members of ethnic
firm were ordered to speak in English unless they were assisting a Chinese-speaking
customer. Margaret Carlson, Only English Spoken Here, TIME, Dec. 5, 1988, at 29.
In Miami, Florida, a supermarket cashier was suspended for speaking in Spanish.
Marshall Ingwerson, English-Only Laws: How Broad?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONI-
TOR, Nov. 29, 1988, at 3.
6 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1988 & Supp. II
1990).
7 Ruth Conniff, The War on Aliens: The Right Calls the Shots, PROGRESSIVE, Oct.
1993, at 22; Penny Loeb, et al., To Make a Nation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct.
4, 1993, at 47; Tim Weiner, On These Shores, Immigrants Find a New Wave of Hostil-
ity, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, at D4 (reaction against immigrants flourishes in times
of economic and political uncertainty).
8 See Tom McArthur, Comment, Worried About Something Else, 60 INr'L J. Soc.
LANGUAGE 87, 91 (1986):
[Supporters of the English-only movement] have never felt the need to
make English the official language of the United States in response to the
agitation of the French in Maine, angry Injuns at Wounded Knee, ag-
grieved Hawaiians, or any other tiny minority. They only defend ... Eng-
lish ... when it is threatened by the one other linguistic tool that signifies
the Americas....
Spanish is the language of masses perceived variously as illiterate, im-
poverished, dirty, backward, criminally inclined, residually Roman Catho-
lic, prone to Communist infiltration, dark-complexioned, and now pushing
cocaine and marijuana north for all they are worth.
There does not have to be much rationality in the response to such fears,
but it can help to make fears tidy and manageable if one talks in an appar-
ently rational manner about the Constitution and safeguarding the nation's
language-English ....
See also J.A. Fishman, "English Only": Its Ghosts, Myths and Dangers, 74 IrTr'L J.
Soc. LANGUAGE 125, 133 (1988) (positing that Anglo insecurity is caused by
America's diminished international stature, poor economic performance, and fears
regarding social mobility for the next generation); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Be-
longing: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 311 (1986):
In America hostility among cultural groups.., is properly seen as a threat
to [national] unity .... Those who react to cultural differences with fear or
[Vol. 74, 1995]
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minority groups who are legal immigrants and citizens often be-
ing perceived as illegal immigrants.9 Historically, increases in the
rate of immigration by non-English-speaking groups have re-
sulted in a corresponding increase in intolerant acts by the Eng-
lish-speaking majority.' ° While judicial analysis of English-only
policies and claims of national origin discrimination have focused
primarily on an individual's ancestry, the concept of national ori-
gin should include the cultural traits associated with that ances-
try, such as language."
In 1991, 1,827,200 immigrants came to the United States:
946,200 were from Mexico; 358,500 were from Asia; and only
135,200 emigrated from Europe.' 2 Between 1980 and 1990, the
number of Hispanics in the United States increased by 53% and
the number of Asians by 107.9%. 13 Estimates project that by the
year 2000 a majority of California's population will be members
of racial and ethnic minorities.' 4 These figures of course do not
include the approximately 300,000 illegal immigrants entering the
country each year, most of whom are from Mexico and Central
America. 15
anger generally espouse nativist policies designed to repress the differences
by excluding the "others" from the country, by forcing them to conform to
the norms of the dominant culture, or by relegating them to a subordinate
status in society.
9 Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 356 (1994).
10 Kathryn K. Imahara & Ki Kim, English Only-Racism in Disguise: An Analysis
of Dimaranan v. PVHMC, 23 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 107, 108 (1992).
11 See Stephen M. Cutler, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims
Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J. 1164, 1166 (1985); see, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,
998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994); Garcia v. Gloor,
618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
12 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1993, at 11.
13 Id. at 18.
14 Karst, supra note 8, at 304 n.6 (citing CENTER FOR CONTINUING STUDY OF THE
CALIFORNIA ECONOMY, PROJECTIONS OF HISPANIC POPULATION FOR CALIFORNIA,
1985-2000. WITH PROJECTIONS OF NON HISPANIC. WHITE. BLACK AND ASIAN &
OTHER POPULATION GROUPS 23 (1982)).
15 Ronald Brownstein & Richard Simon, Hospitality Turns into Hostility, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, at Al, A6; Arthur F. Corwin, The Numbers Game: Estimates
of Illegal Aliens in the United States, 1970-1981, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 223,
248-50 (Richard R. Hofstetter ed., 1984). One study estimates that between
7,979,000 and 9,900,000 people have settled in the United States illegally, with 80%
from Latin America and the Caribbean and two-thirds of the total from Mexico. Id.
Another study, however, places the number between only 2 million and 4 million.
Gaylord Shaw, Number of Illegal Aliens in US. May Be as Low as 2 Million, New
Study Contends, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1985, Section I, at 4.
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In 1980, the population of the United States, excluding infants,
was 210,247,455.16 Eighty-nine percent of the population
(187,187, 415) spoke only English at home, and 11% (23,060,040)
spoke a language other than English at home.17 More than 11
million of those spoke Spanish. 8 Eighty-five percent of the pop-
ulation claimed English as their mother tongue, while less than
one percent (.57%) of the total population could not speak any
English.' 9 Spanish, German, Italian, French, Polish, and Yiddish
were the next most frequently claimed mother tongues in the
1970 and 1979 Bureau of the Census data. 20 Additionally, 121
self-proclaimed "ancestry groups" spoke 385 languages and dia-
lects, and 204 foreign-language newspapers were published.2'
As of 1985, there were at least 13.2 million Spanish speakers in
the United States.22 Today, the United States contains the fourth
or fifth largest Spanish-speaking population in the world, with
estimates ranging from 18 to 30 million.23 By the end of the dec-
ade, Hispanics will be the largest ethnic minority group in the
United States, constituting a significant portion of the work
force.24
Section I of this Article discusses the history of languages in
the United States and the recent official English movement. Sec-
tion II examines the protections established against national ori-
gin employment discrimination and the rights of language
minorities. Section III analyzes the approach of the EEOC and
the courts to the issue of English-only rules in the workplace.
Section IV examines English-only rules under disparate impact
analysis, the appropriate degree of deference given to the EEOC
Guidelines, and the business justification defense. Finally, Sec-
16 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULA-
TION tbl. 99 (1984) [hereinafter 1980 CENSUS].
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Fishman, supra note 8, at 129; 1980 CENSUS, supra note 16, tbl. 99.
20 Mother-Tongue Claiming in the United States Since 1960: Trends and Correlates,
in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ETHNIC REVIVAL: PERSPECTIVES ON LANGUAGE
AND ETHNIcrrY 111, 145-48 (Joshua A. Fishman et al. eds., 1985).
21 The Golden Door, HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 1984, at 47.
22 BILL PIATT, ONLY ENGLISH? LAW AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES 26 (1990).
23 THOMAS WEYR, HISPANIC U.S.A.: BREAKING THE MELTING POT 3 (1988).
24 Peter Cattan, The Growing Presence of Hispanics in the U.S. Work Force,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 1988, at 9; Diego Ribadeneira, Boom Bypassing Mass.
Hispanics, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 1988, Metro, at 1.
[Vol. 74, 1995]
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tion V explores the relationship between an individual's primary
language and his or her national origin.
I
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON LANGUAGES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE OFFICIAL
ENGLISH MOVEMENT
A. History of Languages in the United States
Historically, the United States has been plagued by pervasive
discrimination against certain national origin groups, particularly
Hispanic and Chinese.25 Because threats to majority economic
interests create a need for scapegoats and provide the "emotional
fuel for hostile action, 26 members of language and cultural mi-
norities have faced a torrent of nativist hostility due to their dif-
ferences in language, ethnicity, and religion. 7 Language
25 See Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 852 F.2d 1186, withdrawn, re-reported at 863
F.2d 1407, 1419 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that if necessary for the decision, the court
"would consider the propriety of taking judicial notice of the pervasive discrimina-
tion against Hispanics in California"), cert. denied. 489 U.S. 1080 (1989); Olagues v.
Russoniello. 797 F.2d 1511, 1521 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating "courts have long recog-
nized the history of discriminatory treatment inflicted on Chinese and Hispanic peo-
ple"), vacated for mootness. 484 U.S. 806 (1987); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
479-82 (1954) (holding that individuals of Mexican or Latin American descent were
discriminated against in jury selection); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74
(1886) (holding that municipal ordinance regulating public laundries discriminated
against Chinese immigrants).
26 Karst, supra note 8, at 310; STEPHEN STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH: RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND CLASS IN AMERICA 170 (1981) ("If there is an iron law of ethnicity,
it is that when ethnic groups are found in a hierarchy of power, wealth, and status,
then conflict is inevitable."). For example, White labor union leaders brutally treated
Chinese laborers in nineteenth century California. MALDWYN A. JONES, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION 248-49 (1960); ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY:
LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1971) (discussing the
rationalization for the mistreatment of Chinese immigrants). For a discussion of
early immigration laws directed at the Chinese, see SHIH-SHAN HENRY TSAI, THE
CHINESE EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 56-81 (1986). Similarly, Slavic workers were at-
tacked in the late nineteenth century in the Pennsylvania coal fields. JONES, supra,
at 256-57. During World War II, an association of growers and farmers and some
labor unions provided strong political support for the internment of Japanese-Amer-
icans. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 217 (1962); MORTON GRODZINS,
AMERICANS BETRAYED 19-91 (1949). Economic interests also inspired the 1913
California law prohibiting aliens ineligible for citizenship, principally Asians, from
owning land. JONES, supra, at 253-54; Karst, supra note 8, at 310 n.32; JACOBUS
TENBROEK ET AL., PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1968) (analysis of the
internment process).
27 Karst, supra note 8, at 352 ("A distinctive language sets a cultural group off
from others, with one consistent unhappy consequence throughout American his-
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restrictions have often been used as a means to dominate a na-
tional origin group."
Although English traditionally has been the de facto primary
language in this nation,2 9 multiple languages and cultures have
flourished in the United States since its initial population by Na-
tive-Americans, who spoke hundreds of different languages and
developed varied cultures.30 Today, more than 200 Native Amer-
ican languages are still spoken and studied.3 The story of the
suppression and elimination of native cultures provides a tragic
example of the treatment of and hostility towards perceived
"outsiders. 32
European colonists brought even more languages, with Ger-
tory: discrimination against members of the cultural minority."). Professor Karst
further states:
In all times and places, cultural differences have bred suspicion and fear.
In times of trouble, those fears tend to focus on particular groups of cul-
tural outsiders as a source of danger. It becomes convenient to make scape-
goats of "them"-the people who look different from "us" or whose
language or behavior is foreign to our own. Cultural majorities have
sought to force outsiders to conform to the prevailing cultural norms; alter-
natively, they have sought to dominate and suppress the outsiders, separat-
ing them from the public life of the community.
Id. at 305. For a discussion of the relationship between nativism and immigration,
see JONES, supra note 26, at 147-76, 247-77; JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE
LAND: PArTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925 (2d ed. 1965); Maxine S.
Seller, Historical Perspectives on American Immigration Policy: Case Studies and
Current Implications, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 137, 140-55 (Richard R. Hof-
stetter ed., 1984).
28 Myres S. McDougal et al., Freedom from Discrimination in Choice of Language
and International Human Rights, 1976 ILL. U. L.J. 151, 153 ("Suffocation of lan-
guage has always been part of [the] policies of domination and the struggle for its
maintenance was always a precondition for any political movement of liberation.").
29 In fact, two out of three Americans believe that English is already the official
language of the United States. Califa, supra note 4, at 293, citing Carelli, Survey:
Most Think English Is Official U.S. Language, Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 14, 1987.
30 NANCY FAIRES CONKLIN & MARGARET A. LOURIE, A HOST OF TONGUES:
LANGUAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1983) (discussing the history of
language communities in the United States up to the present).
31 William L. Leap, American Indian Languages, in LANGUAGE IN THE USA 116,
116-44 (Charles A. Ferguson & Shirley Brice Heath ed., 1981) (describing the vari-
ety of Native American languages).32 See generally WILIAM T. HAGAN, AMERICAN INDIANS (rev. ed. 1979) (discuss-
ing the suffering of Native Americans from encounters with settlers during colonial
times through the New Deal era); Irene K. Harvey, Note, Constitutional Law: Con-
gressional Plenary Power over Indian Affairs-A Doctrine Rooted in Prejudice, 10
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 117 (1982) (stating need for control of "inferior" races invigo-
rated Congress' unrestrained power over Native Americans); VINE DELORIA, JR. &
CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 1-24 (1983) (provid-
ing a history of national policy regarding Native Americans).
[Vol. 74, 19951
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man, Spanish, French, Dutch, and Swedish all serving as official
languages in different regions of the United States during the co-
lonial era.33 Perhaps because of this tradition of linguistic diver-
sity, the Constitution fails to mention an official language. The
framers purposely did not give special recognition to English due
to the connection between language and liberty.' In fact, the
Continental Congress issued official publications, including the
Articles of Confederation, in French, German, and English dur-
ing the Revolutionary War era.35
Yet a conflict existed between the Jeffersonian view of individ-
ual liberty and the movement towards assimilation and Ameri-
canization.36 Jefferson, who was fluent in French and studied the
Anglo-Saxon language, viewed ability in several languages as
necessary for politics and law.37 In contrast, John Adams pro-
posed a national language academy designed to establish stan-
dards for the English language; however, his proposal was
rejected because of the conflict between government regulation
of language and freedom of speech. 38 The demand for assimila-
tion was expressed by John Jay in The Federalist: "Providence
has been pleased to give this one connected country to one
united people-a people descended from the same ancestors,
speaking the same language, professing the same religion, at-
tached to the same principles of government, very similar in their
manners and customs. .. ." The purchase and conquest of ter-
ritories from France, Mexico, and Spain caused increased con-
33 CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 30, at 3-58.
34 Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages,
Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 274 (1992); see also
Shirley Brice Heath, Language and Politics in the United States, in LINGUISTICS AND
ANTHROPOLOGY 267, 270 (Muriel Saville-Troike ed., 1977) ("[E]arly political lead-
ers recognized the close connection between language and religious/cultural free-
doms, and they preferred to refrain from proposing legislation which might be
construed as a restriction of these freedoms."); David F. Marshall, The Question of
an Official Language: Language Rights and the English Language Amendment, 60
INT'L J. Soc. LANGUAGE 7. 10-11 (1986).
35 Perea, supra note 34, at 285-86.
36 Id. at 276, 293 n.104.
37 Id. at 289 ("With respect to modem languages, French ... is indispensable.
Next to this the Spanish is most important to an American.") (quoting letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph, Jr. (July 6, 1787), in 11 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 494, 557 (Julian A. Boyd et al. eds., 1950)).
38 Shirley Brice Heath, A National Language Academy? Debate in the New Na-
tion, 11 INT'L J. Soc. LANGUAGE 19, 22 (1976); Marshall, supra note 34, at 11.
39 THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 94 (John Jay) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
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cern regarding other languages.4  For example, before Louisiana
could become a state, Congress required that the state constitu-
tion provide that all legislative and judicial documents be re-
corded in English.41
During the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries,
German was the most widely spoken language after English and
served as an important language in public and private life. 2 In
1870, the United States Commissioner of Education recognized
the importance of the German language: "'[T]he German lan-
guage has actually become the second language of our Republic,
and a knowledge of German is now considered essential to a fin-
ished education."'43 In Pennsylvania, "German schools received
public funding well into the nineteenth century."" However, the
strength of the German language and the foreign-born popula-
tion was not always viewed in positive terms.45 For example, in
1727 Germans were required to sign a loyalty oath in Penn-
sylvania.' In 1798, in response to the threat of war with France,
Congress extended the period for naturalization from two to
fourteen years.47 Because of a fear that aliens were engaging in
"treasonable or secret machinations against the government,"48
Congress at the same time passed the Alien and Sedition Acts,
which gave the President authority to seize and deport any alien
without accusation or hearing and made forceful criticism of gov-
ernment officials a crime.49 Jefferson described the Acts as "a
40 Bernard J. McFadden, Bilingual Education and the Law, 12 J. L. & EDUC. 1, 6-7
(1983).
41 Stephen T. Wagner, America's Non-English Heritage, 19 SOCIETY 37, 39 (1972).
42 Califa, supra note 4, at 293, 296-97; Valerie A. Lexion. Note, Language Minor-
ity Voting Rights and the English Language Amendment, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
657, 659 (1987).
43 Califa, supra note 4, at 297.
44 CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 30, at 65.45 Note, "Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services
in the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1348-49 n.23 (1987) [hereinafter Official Eng-
lish] (quoting Benjamin Franklin's anti-German sentiment: "[W]hy should the Pala-
tine [German] boors be suffered to swarm in our settlements and, by herding
together, establish their language and manners to the exclusion of ours? Why
should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a colony of aliens, who will
shortly be so numerous as to germanize us instead of our anglifying them?").
46 JONES, supra note 26, at 47-48.
47 Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 54, § 1, 1 Stat. 566 (1778), repealed by Naturali-
zation Act of 1802, ch. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 153, 153-54 (1802).
48 JANE PERRY CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO
EUROPE 37 (1931).
49 Alien and Sedition Act, ch. 66 § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (1798), repealed by ch. 28, § 5, 2
Stat. 155 (1802).
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most detestable thing." 50 Although the Alien Act was never en-
forced, foreign-born critics of the government were prosecuted
under the Sedition Act.5
Beginning in the 1890s, an increasingly negative sentiment de-
veloped against non-English-speaking immigrants from Southern
and Eastern Europe due to their different religions and cul-
tures.52 A government-sponsored commission in 1911 contrasted
the "old" immigrants from Scandinavia and Germany (stable, in-
dustrious, and easily assimilated) with the "new" immigrants
(less intelligent, too urban, transient, and difficult to assimi-
late).53 The new immigrants were predominantly Roman Catho-
lic and Orthodox in contrast to the earlier Anglo-Saxon and
Protestant settlers.54 At the same time, the United States was
transforming from an agricultural to an industrial nation, creat-
ing greater competition for jobs and fears of economic recession.
The combination of these religious and economic fears caused an
increased nativist sentiment and a commensurate effort to Amer-
icanize the foreigners.55  The Americanization movement fo-
cused on restricting non-English languages by creating English
language requirements for voting, employment, and education.56
After vetoes by three consecutive presidents, Congress in 1917
enacted a provision requiring a literacy test for immigrants in an
effort to restrict the number of immigrants from Southern and
Eastern Europe.57
50 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 31, 1798), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 41 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).
51 Karst, supra note 8, at 317.
52 CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 30, at 34; Marshall, supra note 34, at 12.
53 Califa, supra note 4, at 297 n.23; see also KENJI HAKUTA. MIRROR OF LAN-
GUAGE: THE DEBATE ON BILINGUALISM 17 (1986) (statement of Francis A. Walker,
former president of MIT) ("These immigrants are beaten men from beaten races,
representing the worst failures in the struggle for existence .... Europe is allowing
its slums and its most stagnant reservoirs of degraded peasantry to be drained off
upon our soil.").
54 Califa, supra note 4, at 297 n.23; HAKUTA, supra note 53, at 16-17.
55 Marshall. supra note 34, at 12 (describing a "newly defined ethnocentricity");
see also Joseph Leibowicz, Note, The Proposed English Language Amendment:
Shield or Sword?, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 519, 533-39 (1985) (discussing the role of
English language education in the Americanization movement). For a definition of
nativism, see HIGHAM, supra note 27, at 4: "[I]ntense opposition to an internal mi-
nority on the ground of its foreign (i.e., 'un-American') connections .... While
drawing on much broader cultural antipathies and ethnocentric judgments, nativism
translates them into a zeal to destroy the enemies of a distinctively American way of
life."
56 Leibowicz, supra note 55, at 533-34.
57 Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874, 877, 8 U.S.C. § 136 (1946), repealed, 66
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In contrast to these efforts, several states officially recognized
languages other than English. Because of the large and influen-
tial German population, Pennsylvania published many state laws
and other documents in German and gave legal recognition to
the German language in several statutes.58 California and New
Mexico gave similar recognition to Spanish, while Louisiana rec-
ognized French.59 For example, California's first constitution
provided for the publishing of laws in both Spanish and Eng-
lish.60 In 1879, however, the rapid increase in English speakers
brought to California by the gold rush eroded the influence of
the Spanish-speaking natives, and the California Constitution
was changed to prohibit the publication of laws in a language
other than English.61 Because of its long-standing connection to
Hispanic culture, New Mexico published its laws in English and
Spanish until 1953, and today continues to recognize the impor-
tance of its bilingual history and culture:
[t]he state of New Mexico hereby reaffirms its advocacy of the
teaching of other language in the United States and its belief
that the position of English is not threatened. Proficiency on
the part of our citizens in more than one language is to the
economic and cultural benefit of our state and the nation ....
Proficiency in English plus other languages should be en-
couraged throughout the state.62
In Louisiana, the Constitution of 1974 recognized the right of
residents "to preserve, foster, and promote their respective his-
toric linguistic and cultural origins. 63
Stat. 279, 280 (1952) (The test worked to exclude "[a]ll aliens over sixteen years of
age, physically capable of reading, who can not read the English language, or some
other language or dialect, including Hebrew or Yiddish .... ). Statements made in
Congress at that time have a frightening similarity to Nazi propaganda from World
War II: "If, therefore, the principle of individual liberty, guarded by a constitutional
government created on this continent nearly a century and a half ago, is to endure,
the basic strain of our population must be maintained." ROBERT A. DIVINE, AMERI-
CAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1924-1952, at 15 (1957).
58 Perea, supra note 34, at 310-315.
59 Id. at 309.
60 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 21 (1849), reprinted in JOHN Ross BROWNE, REPORT OF
THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF THE
STATE CONSTITUTION app. (photo. reprint-1973) (1850) ("All laws, decrees, regula-
tions, and provisions, which from their nature require publication, shall be published
in English and Spanish.").
61 CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (repealed 1966); see also Perea, supra note 34, at 319.
62 PIATr, supra note 22, at 25 (quoting Supporting Language Rights in the United
States, Resolution of the New Mexico Legislature (1989)).
63 LA. CONST. art. XII, § 4. For a discussion of the history of bilingualism in these
states, see Perea, supra note 34, at 309-28.
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By World War I, nativist fervor and the level of suspicion
against foreigners increased significantly. 64 For example, Iowa
required the use of English in all telephone conversations,
schools, and church services, while several other states prohibited
the use of non-English languages in both public and private
schools. 65 By 1919, fifteen states had banned the teaching of for-
eign languages. 66 For example, a Nebraska statute stated that
"[n]o person ...shall teach any subject to any person in any
language other than the English language .... "67 The Supreme
Court reversed a parochial teacher's conviction under the statute
for reading bible stories in German.68 Many states also required
64 Michele Arington, Comment, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The
Battle in the States over Language Minority Rights, 7 J. L. & POL. 325, 330 n.36
(1991).
65 Id.; CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 30, at 70.
66 HIGHAM, supra note 27, at 260. For a discussion of the legal restrictions on
German language and culture during World War I, see Perea, supra note 34, at 329-
32.
67 1919 Neb. Laws 249.
68 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). In Meyer, the state argued that
the legislation was designed "to prevent children reared in America from being
trained and educated in foreign languages and foreign ideals before they have had
an opportunity to learn the English language and observe American ideals." See
Carol Schmid, Comment, Language Rights And The Legal Status Of English-Only
Laws In The Public And Private Sector, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 65, 70 (1992) (quoting
Brief and Argument of State of Nebraska, Defendant in Error, at 12-13, Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). The Court reversed the conviction, stating:
[T]he individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected.
The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other
languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it
would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordi-
nary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the
Constitution-a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. Striking down similar statutes in Ohio and Iowa at the same
time, the Court held that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because it interfered with the profession of language teachers,
with parents' control over the education of their children, and with the child's own
education. Id. at 399. See Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 409 (1923). Meyer still
stands for the proposition that a government invasion of personal identity and free-
dom will be found invalid if it is directed at discrete and insular minorities outside
the normal political process. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1319-20 (2d ed. 1988). Language minorities have not been recognized as a sus-
pect class for equal protection purposes. See Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp.
752 (D. Or. 1973) (holding that a tavern's policy against the speaking of any "for-
eign" language was unlawful racial discrimination against Mexican-Americans). The
court rejected the tavern owner's argument that the English-only rule was justified
because of the other customers' irritation with Spanish-speaking patrons, stating:
Just as the Constitution forbids banishing blacks to the back of the bus so
as not to arouse the racial animosity of the preferred white passengers, it
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teachers to be citizens.6 9 Because of these restrictions, the
number of students studying German fell from approximately
324,000 in 1915 to less than 14,000 in 1922.70 Language restric-
tions also affected the public education of Asian and Hispanic
children.71 In the Southwest, "Mexican-American children were
prohibited from speaking their native language anywhere on
school grounds. Those who violated the 'No Spanish' rule were
severely punished. ' 72 Similarly, native French-speaking students
were severely punished for speaking in French.73 Children of
language minority groups were also segregated into separate and
unequal schools. 74 Continuing even into the present, this segre-
gation of minority language group students and suppression of
native languages results in an especially high dropout rate for
also forbids ordering Spanish-speaking patrons to the "back booth or out"
to avoid antagonizing English-speaking beer-drinkers.
.. Catering to prejudice out of fear of provoking greater prejudice only
perpetuates racism. Courts faithful to the Fourteenth Amendment will not
permit, either by camouflage or cavalier treatment, equal protection so to
be profaned.
Hernandez, 368 F. Supp. at 755-56. For arguments that official English laws violate
the Equal Protection Clause, see Arington, supra note 64, at 335-37 ("To the extent,
therefore, that courts identify English-only laws as creating a language-based distinc-
tion which merely disguises underlying racially or ethnically motivated discrimina-
tion, such laws may be, and should be, invalidated under the fourteenth amendment
[sic]"); Califa, supra note 4, at 330-46; Perea, supra note 34, at 356-71.
69 Karst, supra note 8, at 314. These bans were later declared unconstitutional.
See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer, 262 U.S. 390.
70 Wagner, supra note 41, at 41.
71 See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1973); United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 853 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc); Cisneros v. Corpus
Christi Indep. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 144 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc); Soria v.
Oxnard School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 155 (C.D. Cal. 1971); see also Jorge C. Rangel &
Carlos M. Alcala, Project Report: De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas Schools,
7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 307, 379 (1972); Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Jr.,
Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 662, 711-15 (1975).
72 United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 412 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982). Into the 1950s, "children who spoke Spanish
in school were made to kneel on upturned bottle caps, forced to hold bricks in out-
stretched hands in the schoolyard, or told to put their nose in a chalk circle drawn on
a blackboard. And this would happen in Texas towns that were 98 percent Spanish-
speaking." WEYR, supra note 23, at 52.
73 See James H. Domengeaux, Comment, Native-Born Acadians and the Equality
Ideal, 46 LA. L. REV. 1151, 1154-55 (1986).
74 See United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. at 411 ("[S]egregation of Mexican-
Americans is a historical fact in Texas public schools."); Greenfield & Kates, supra
note 71, at 714 n.299.
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those students.75 These language and cultural restrictions have a
detrimental impact on language minority children. 76 Regarding a
school policy which effectively prohibited Native American stu-
dents from wearing long, braided hair, Justice Douglas wrote:
The results of such a policy ... to force all students into one
homogeneous mold even when it impinges on their racial and
cultural values, have been disastrous for the young Indian
child who is taught in school that the culture in which he has
been reared is not important or valid. 77
In addition, expert testimony demonstrates that "a child who
goes to a school where he finds no evidence of his language and
culture and ethnic group represented becomes withdrawn and
nonparticipating."78
During World War I and the Red Scare of 1919-1920, the gov-
ernment and private organizations attempted to coerce "Ameri-
canization" by pressuring immigrants to become citizens,
abandon their native languages, and demonstrate a "conformist
loyalty intolerant of any values not functional to it."'79 Efforts
included workers being compelled by their employer to become
citizens and abandon Old World dress and manners. 80 Congress
also doubled the income tax on "non-resident aliens."81 Even
more coercive measures were introduced in Congress but failed
to pass, including the deportation of aliens who did not apply for
citizenship or learn English, as well as the "suppression of the
foreign-language press, mass internments, [and] the denial of in-
dustrial employment to aliens. '"82
In 1924, Congress enacted legislation over a presidential veto
75 See Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary
Language in the Workplace, 23 MicH. J. L. REF. 265, 284-85 n.115 (1990).
76 See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972), affd, 499
F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
77 New Rider v. Board of Educ., 414 U.S. 1097, 1102-03 (1973) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari).
78 Serna, 499 F.2d at 1150.
79 HIGHAM, supra note 27, at 247; see also Leibowicz, supra note 55, at 538 ("The
fact that language can be used as an offensive and ugly weapon against foreign-
language speakers, whether through political, economic, or educational require-
ments, is, however, an unavoidable lesson of the Americanization movement.").
80 HIGHAM, supra note 27, at 235-50.
81 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 210, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062 (1919), revised and su-
perseded by 42 Stat. 320 (1921).
82 HIGHAM, supra note 27, at 250; see also Karst, supra note 8, at 314 n.54 ("The
National Americanization Committee further recommended congressional legisla-
tion requiring semiannual registration of the whole population and internment of
those who had 'anti-American' sympathy.") (citing HIGHAM, supra note 27, at 249).
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which established national origin quotas for immigration.8 3 By
establishing quotas based on the prospective immigrant's country
of origin, Congress sought to restrict immigration by non-north-
ern European people.84 President Truman strongly opposed the
national origin quotas in his message vetoing the McCarran-Wal-
ter Immigration Act:
[T]he idea behind this discriminatory policy was, to put it
baldly, that Americans with English or Irish names were bet-
ter people and better citizens than Americans with Italian or
Greek or Polish names. It was thought that people of West
European origin made better citizens than Rumanians or
Yugoslavs or Ukranians or Hungarians or Balts or Austrians.
Such a concept is utterly unworthy of our traditions and our
ideals. It violates the great political doctrine of the Declara-
tion of Independence that 'all men are created equal.' 85
In response to the increased hostility towards immigrants, Con-
gress nevertheless passed the quota system, which radically re-
stricted immigration by imposing quotas based on the population
composition of 1890 prior to the wave of immigrants from south-
ern and eastern Europe.' Following the repeal of the national
origins quota system, the majority of immigrants have come from
Latin America and Asia.8 7
Similarly, during World War II, state laws prohibited the use of
foreign languages due to anti-German and anti-Japanese senti-
ment in an effort to force assimilation of immigrants by requiring
83 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 155, 159; see also EDWARD P.
HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-
1965, at 470-74 (1981) (explaining the quota system and the delay in the effective
date of the system).
84 HUTCHINSON, supra note 83, at 470-74; see also Juan F. Perea. Ethnicity And
Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 805, 811 (1994).
85 President Truman, Veto of Bill to Revise the Laws Relating to Immigration,
Naturalization, and Nationality, Pub. Papers 441, 443 (June 25, 1952), quoted in
Perea, supra note 84, at 815.
86 Karst, supra note 8, at 311; cf. HIGHAM, supra note 27, at 300-01 (discussing the
politics behind the immigration quotas).
87 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (current revision
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1525 (1988)); see also Henry Fairlie, Why I Love America, NEW
REPUBLIC, July 4, 1983, at 12, 17 (quoting Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan):
In fiscal year 1973, the top ten visa-issuing ports were Manila, Monterrey,
Seoul, Tijuana, Santo Domingo, Mexico City, Naples, Guadalajara, To-
ronto, and Kingston. I would expect Bombay to make this top ten list
before long .... In short, by the end of the century, the United States will
be a multi-ethnic nation the like of which even we have never imagined.
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the acquisition of English.88 Suspicion of foreigners also resulted
in the forced internment of Japanese-Americans during the Sec-
ond World War.89
This tradition of pervasive discrimination has resulted in lower
wages, less prestigious jobs, and limited employment opportuni-
ties for members of ethnic and language minority groups.9" In
particular, Hispanic individuals continue to find limited opportu-
nities in prestigious and high-paying positions.9'
88 Heath, supra note 34, at 275.
89 For an analysis of the internment process, see TENBROEK, supra note 26;
FRANK F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LAW AND JAPANESE AMERICANS
(1976) (discussing the legal history of Japanese-Americans in the United States).
90 See Greenfield & Kates, supra note 71, at 718 ("[T]he pattern of employment
of the Mexican American, dictated through the discrimination encountered, has
been the major factor contributing to the isolation of the Mexican American from
the majority population.") (footnote omitted); MICHAEL A. BARRERA, RACE AND
CLASS IN THE SOUTHWEST: A THEORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 62-99 (1979) (dis-
cussing the employment history of Chicano and Mexican immigrants); JOAN W.
MOORE, MEXICAN AMERICANS 61 (1st ed. 1970) ("In nearly all of the broad occupa-
tional classifications ... Mexicans held poorer jobs paying less money than did na-
tive American whites."). Professor Moore states:
It is perfectly obvious from the most superficial examination of the data
that in general Mexican Americans hold the less desirable jobs in the
Southwest because of lack of education, lack of business capital, cultural
dissimilarity to the majority, and their obvious role as a low-prestige group.
Further, Mexicans are disproportionately forced to work in low-wage or
marginal firms - in the less profitable, non-unionized fringes of the high-
wage industries. Low job earnings are also associated with the concentra-
tion of Mexicans in certain low-wage geographical areas, the lower Rio
Grande valley of Texas being an example. (Of course, such areas are "low-
wage" partly because they are heavily Mexican).
Id. at 63; Verdugo & Verdugo, Earnings Differentials Between Mexican American,
Black, and White Male Workers, in THE MEXICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: AN IN-
TERDISCIPLINARY ANTHOLOGY 133, 136 (1985):
[W]hites fared better than either blacks or Mexican Americans
socioeconomically. Whites earned more, had completed more years of
schooling, and worked at far better jobs than either Blacks or Mexican
Americans. Whites also appeared to be more fully employed as they
worked more hours than either Blacks or Mexican Americans.
91 See Linda E. Dvila, The Underrepresentation of Hispanic Attorneys in Corpo-
rate Law Firms, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1404 (1987) (footnotes omitted):
Despite many advances, minority representation in the legal profession, as
in most prestigious fields, is still not proportionate to the minority presence
in the general population. But even within the legal world, corporate law
firms have been slower than other professional groups in moving toward a
more proportionate racial balance .... One survey reported that Hispan-
ics represent less than 1 percent of the attorneys in the 151 biggest law
firms in the United States.
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B. Recent Efforts to Declare English the Official Language
Many people continue to view the expanded multicultural and
ethnically diverse population as a threat to "United States cul-
ture and to the English language."'9 The official English move-
ment and the accompanying increase in workplace language
restrictions reflect a backlash against the growing number of im-
migrants, both legal and illegal.93 Arguing that our national
unity depends on the English language, proponents of English-
only laws seek to protect the language by constitutional amend-
ment or legislation.94 Supporters of the English Language
Amendment argue that the supremacy of the English language is
being threatened and that our nation will dissolve into a "frac-
tionalized, multilingual society. '95 In support, they contend that
92 Linda M. Mealey, Note, English-Only Rules and "Innocent" Employers: Clari-
fying National Origin Discrimination and Disparate Impact Theory Under Title VII,
74 MINN. L. REv. 387, 389-90 (1989) (internal quotation omitted); see also Karst,
supra note 8, at 311 ("Those who react to cultural differences with fear or anger
generally espouse nativist policies designed to repress the differences by excluding
the 'others' from the country, by forcing them to conform to the norms of the domi-
nant culture, or by relegating them to a subordinate status in society.").
93 Califa, supra note 4, at 294, 297-99; Official English, supra note 45, at 1349;
Lexion, supra note 42, at 661; Mealey, supra note 92, at 389 n.15; Margaret Carlson.
Only English Spoken Here: Language as Politics Spawns a Backlash Against Immi-
grants, TIME, Dec. 5, 1988, at 29 (discussing accusations that race and xenophobia
are the true motivating factors for English-only ballot initiatives).
94 See The English Language Amendment Hearing on S.J. Res. 167 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1984) (statement of Sen. Denton), 15 (statement of Sen. Huddleston), 53
(statement of Hon. S.I. Hayakawa, former Senator). Contra William G. Milan,
Comment: Undressing the English Language Amendment, 60 INT'L J. Soc. LAN-
GUAGE 93, 95 (1986) ("[T]he greatest myth of all is that there is a necessary connec-
tion between speaking English and being an American. Equating American
nationalism with the 'melting pot' is nothing more than a confusion of the concepts
of unity and uniformity."); Liebowicz, supra note 55, at 530 (arguing that declaring
English the official language of the United States "mak[es] precisely the mistake of
equating the obviousness of language usage with its importance to national unity").
95 Arington, supra note 64, at 327; see also The English Language Amendment:
Hearings on S.J. Res. 167 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1984) (statement of Sen. Denton);
S.J. Res. 13, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S7615 (daily ed. June 4, 1987)
(statement of Sen. Symms). Consider the following statement by columnist George
Will:
[Teddy Roosevelt] embodied the vigor of the nation during the flood tide
of immigration. He said: "We have room for but one language here and
that is the English language, for we intend to see that the crucible turns our
people out as Americans, of American nationality, and not as dwellers in a
polyglot boarding house." American life, with its atomizing emphasis on
individualism, increasingly resembles life in a centrifuge. Bilingualism is a
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bilingual programs maintain other languages and cultures to the
detriment of immigrants learning English.96 Moreover, English-
only laws would ensure that all citizens become proficient in
English in order to fully participate in the political process and
advance socio-economically.97
The leading group supporting the English-Only movement is
U.S.ENGLISH, whose founding members include former U.S.
Senator S.I. Hayakawa and Dr. John Tanton.98 U.S.ENGLISH
lobbies for state and federal constitutional amendments declar-
ing English the official language.99 The group's supporters seek
to restrict government funding for bilingual education by limiting
it to short-term transitional programs, and they seek to abolish
multilingual ballots. 100 They argue that bilingual education and
gratuitous intensification of disintegrative forces. It imprisons immigrants
in their origins and encourages what Jacques Barzun, a supporter of the
constitutional amendment, calls "cultural solipsism."
George Will, In Defense of the Mother Tongue, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1985, at 78. As
an example of the response to the fear that "Americans" will feel like outsiders in
their own country, a city ordinance was enacted in Monterey Park, California requir-
ing businesses to include the roman alphabet in signs because of the increasing
number of Asian restaurants and shops. Mike Ward, Language Problem Arises in
City, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1985. at 5, col. 2 (Orange Cty. ed.).
96 Barnaby Zall & Martha Jimenez. Official Use of English: Do We Need a Consti-
tutional Amendment?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at 34 (Opponents of bilingual pro-
grams do not demand the abandonment of native languages and traditions; instead,
they argue that private individuals and organizations rather than government should
promote them). Id.
97 S.J. Res. 13, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. Rac. S7615 (daily ed. June 4,
1987) (statement of Sen. Symms): Arington, supra note 64, at 327.
98 Tim W. Ferguson, The Bilingual Battle, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1988, at 22. Sup-
port for the group's efforts is evidenced by its 350,000 members in 1988 and annual
budget of seven million dollars. JAMES CRAWFORD, BILINGUAL EDUCATION: His-
TORY, POLITICS, THEORY AND PRACTICE 54 (1989). Its membership grew to 400,000
in 1990. Schmid, supra note 68, at 65 n.1.
99 Guy Wright, U.S. English, S.F. SUNDAY EXAMINER & CHRON., Mar. 20, 1983,
at B9. But see Braj B. Kachru, American English and Other Englishes, in LAN-
GUAGE IN THE USA 21 (1981) (declaring that English is the only language that can
claim to be universal).100 See The English Language Amendment: Hearing on S.J. Res. 167 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 60-61 (1984) (statement of S.I. Hayakawa, Co-Founder, U.S.ENGLISH) (arguing
that multilingual elections threaten America and bilingual education is merely an
effort to secure employment for Hispanic teachers); Gerda Bikales, Testimony on
FY. 1984 Appropriations for Bilingual Education, at 2 (May 24, 1983) ("Bilingual
education retards the acquisition of English language skills, and the integration of
the students into the American mainstream .... When the children continue to be
taught in the language of origin, we give them and their parents very ambiguous
signals, which may well lead them to conclude that English is perhaps not essential
at all."); Official English, supra note 45, at 1345.
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ballots impede English acquisition and threaten national unity. 10'
In addition, they assert that the demands for bilingual services
and education are a novel request in the nation's history.10 2
U.S.ENGLISH argues that the proposed amendments will prohibit
efforts that diminish the supremacy of English by requiring state
and federal government efforts to preserve and enhance the use
of English, such as setting money aside to fund English classes. 0 3
Supporters of such efforts contend that the amendments are nec-
essary to promote communication and immigrant assimilation
into American society because recent immigrants are not learn-
ing English.' * The organization asserts Hispanic leaders, as well
as other ethnic minorities, resist learning English, "reject the
melting-pot" concept, resist assimilation as a betrayal of their an-
cestral culture, and demand government funding to maintain
their ethnic institutions. 10 5 Supporters of English-only rules ar-
gue that a person's culture should be maintained in the home
101 Califa, supra note 4, at 317-18.
102 See The English Language Amendment: Hearing on S.J. Res. 167 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 16 (1984) (statement of Sen. Huddleston) (quoting THEODORE H. WHTrE,
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF (1982)):
Some Hispanics have, however, made a demand never voiced by immi-
grants before: that the United States, in effect, officially recognize itself as a
bicultural, bilingual nation .... [They] demand that the United States
become a bilingual country, with all children entitled to be taught in the
language of their heritage, at public expense.
But see Perea, supra note 34, at 327 ("Whatever the merits of the extensive current
debates about bilingual education, it has existed as a legitimate, state-supported
form of education since our nation's beginning.").
103 Gail D. Cox, 'English Only': A Legal Polyglot, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 26, 1987, at 9.
104 The English Language Amendment: Hearing on S.J. Res. 167 Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8-9 (1984) (statement of Sen. Denton) ("English is not recognized or treated by
the U.S. government as the country's official language. As a result, the newest immi-
grants to the United States, unlike their predecessors, are not learning English.");
English First, Immigration Bill: Burdens the Nation; Fuels Bilingual Crisis, Members'
Report, Dec. 1986, at 1-2 ("These children will remain part of that population which
never learns English .... ); Jeffrey Schmalz, Hispanic Influx Spurs 3 Ballots on
Language, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1988, at Al.
105 Guy Wright, U.S. English, S.F. SUNDAY EXAMINER & CHRON., Mar. 20, 1983,
at B9; Gerda Bikales & Gary Imhoff, A Kind of Discordant Harmony 10
(U.S.ENGLISH 1985) ("[A] vocal Hispanic leadership ... gives lip service to the
need of Hispanics to learn English while excoriating any practical English-language
instruction that does not also reinforce the native language .... [T]he definition of
the inability to speak English as prima facie evidence of membership in a disadvan-
taged and discriminated-against group entitled to affirmative action benefits, has re-
warded limited English-language ability .... ).
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rather than in public. 1 6 The organization's current literature,
although written in more general terms, evidences the same
goals: to "'reform bilingual education through funding flexibility
and accountability for effective programs'; 'to promote opportu-
nities for adults to learn English'; and 'to uphold language and
civic requirements for naturalization.m 1" 0 7
Several states have adopted state constitutional amendments
declaring English the official state language. 0 8 Many of these
official English language provisions are merely symbolic and
have limited significance, as evidenced by their inclusion in code
sections designating the official state tree, flag, bird, flower,
mammal, fish, shell, insect, and beverage. 0 9 California's amend-
ment, however, declares English the official language of the state
and gives power to the legislature to enforce the amendment by
appropriate legislation. 110 In addition, the amendment directs
legislative and state officials to ensure that the role of English is
preserved and enhanced, and prohibits actions by the legislature
which diminish or ignore the role of English as the state's com-
mon language."' In contrast, other states, including Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Wyoming, have defeated official-English ef-
forts.1'2 Similarly, Oregon's legislature denounced official-Eng-
lish legislation as "impair[ing] our pluralistic ideals." 113
106 David Beers, 'Us' and 'Them': Push to Make English 'Official' Goes Beyond
the Issue of Language, L.A. DAILY J., July 25, 1986, at 4.
107 U.S.ENGLISH FACTS (U.S.ENGLISH, Washington, D.C.), July 1990, quoted
in Perea, supra note 34, at 343.
108 In 1986, legislators in twelve states introduced official-English bills: Alabama,
Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Official English, supra note 45, at
1346 n.10 (citation omitted). In 1986, California passed its official-English amend-
ment. Cox, supra note 103, at 10. Arizona, Colorado, and Florida have adopted
state constitutional amendments declaring English the official state language. Perea,
supra note 34, at 342 n.407 and accompanying text. Illinois declared "American" its
official state language in 1923. Official English, supra note 45, at 1346 n.7. Arkan-
sas, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina,
North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee. and Virginia have also declared English
the state's official language. PIATr, supra note 22, at 22.
109 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-4-117 (Supp. 1989); ILL. Am. STAT. ch. 1, pa-
ras. 2901-20 (Smith-Hurd 1991) (amending a 1923 law declaring "American" the
official state language); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-2-10-1 (Burns 1993); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 2.013 (MichielBobbs-Merriil) (1992); Miss. CODE AN . § 3-3-31 (1991); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 54-02-13 (1989).
110 CAL. CONsT. art. III, § 6 (1986).
Ill Id.
112 Cox, supra note 103, at 10.
113 S.J. Res. 16, 65th Or. Leg. Ass. (1989).
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Resolutions for an English Language Amendment have been
regularly introduced in Congress since 1981. 1 In 1989 alone,
four resolutions were introduced in Congress proposing to
amend the Constitution to establish English as the official lan-
guage of the United States."15 The most restrictive proposed bill
provides as follows:
SECTION 1. The English language shall be the official lan-
guage of the United States.
SECTION 2. Neither the United States nor any State shall
require, by law, ordinance, regulation, order, decree, program,
or policy, the use in the United States of any language other
than English.
SECTION 3. This article shall not prohibit any law, ordi-
nance, regulation, order, decree, program, or policy-
(1) to provide educational instruction in a language other
than English for the purpose of making students who use a
language other than English proficient in English;
(2) to teach a foreign language to students who are already
proficient in English;
(3) to protect public health and safety; or
(4) to allow translators for litigants, defendants, or wit-
nesses in court cases.
SECTION 4. The Congress and the States may enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.
16
An earlier prepared English Language Amendment did not pro-
vide exceptions in Section 3.117 Note that the bill does not pro-
vide an exception for the use of multilingual ballots or other
assistance to voters as provided for in the Voting Rights Act.118
Some municipalities have also enacted English-only laws. In
114 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 109, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 171, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.C. Res. 13, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 81,
102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 96, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc.
902 (1985); S. Res. 20, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 737 (1985); H.R.J.
Res. 169, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 3618 (1983); S.J. Res. 167, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S25049 (1983); SJ. Res. 72, 97th Cong. 1st Sess.,
127 CONG. REc. S7400 (1981).
115 H.R.J. Res. 23. 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 106 (1989); H.R.J. Res.
48, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 209 (1989); H.R.J. Res. 79, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 268 (1989); H.R.J. Res. 81, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135
CONG. REC. 268 (1989).
116 H.R.J. Res. 656, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. 24108 (1988).
117 See S.J. Res. 13, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. 348 (1987).
11842 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1) (1984); see also Califa, supra note 4, at 303-11, 330
(analyzing the impact the English Language Amendment would have on language
policy in the areas of education, voting, and employment discrimination, and con-
cluding that "[tihe effects of the legislation are negative-deprivation of voting and
education rights, increased hostility among groups, and a weaker nation").
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1980, Dade County Florida passed an ordinance (which was
amended and weakened in 1984). 119 Other municipalities which
have passed English-only ordinances include Los Altos, Fillmore,
and Monterey Park, California, and Lowell, Massachusetts. 120
C. Opposition to the Official English Movement
Despite the contrary claims by official English proponents, cul-
tural diversity and multilingualism do not pose a threat to the
survival of the United States. 2 ' The principle goal of the official
English movement, however, is not to preserve the English lan-
guage or save the integrity of the United States. As described by
one commentator:
This proposal.. . is little more than a nativist symbol. It is not
needed for the conduct of the public's business.... Nor does
the proposal advance the cohesion of a multicultural na-
tion.... The proposed amendment is an insult to the twenty
million people in this country who speak a mother tongue that
is not English, and a gratuitous insult at that.' 22
Many Hispanic leaders view the official English movement as a
separatist effort directed primarily at Hispanics and motivated by
prejudice and fear.'23 The history of the official English move-
ment also demonstrates that it is founded on nativist fears and
prejudices.124  Furthermore, the proposed amendments fail to
achieve the stated goals of promoting English acquisition and na-
tional unity. 125
119 See Marshall Ingwerson, In Miami, Sharp Tongues Battle over Bilingualism,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 17, 1987, at 3, col. 4.
120 Cox, supra note 103, at 9; Mitchell Zuckoff, Lowell Voters Endorse English as
City's 'Official Language', BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 1989, at 31.
121 Karst, supra note 8, at 362; CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 30, at 157; see also
It's UnAmerican, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 1988, at 35 ("It is hard to argue that linguistic
separatism is really a threat to America, which is at once one of the most ethnically
heterogeneous and linguistically homogeneous nations in the world.").
122 Karst, supra note 8, at 351 (footnotes omitted).
123 The English Language Amendment. Hearing of S.J. Res. 167 Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 163 (1984) (statement of Arnoldo S. Torres, National Executive Director,
League of United Latin American Citizens) ("It is our belief that [the official Eng-
lish amendment] is a backhanded attempt to further ostracize Hispanics and other
language minorities from fully participating in society in the same way that Jim
Crow laws ostracized Blacks. It is this separatist movement by these 'Americans'
that must be stopped.").124 See discussion of Dr. Tanton infra note 220 and accompanying text.
125 In opposition to the proposed English language amendment, Senator Pete
Domenici (R. N.M.) stated:
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Opponents of the official English movement declare that "pri-
macy of English is nowhere threatened."' 26 The Mexican Ameri-
can Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the National Council
of La Raza, and Chinese for Affirmative Action contend that re-
strictions on the use of native languages inhibit rather than en-
courage the learning of English, and that groups such as
U.S.ENGLISH create divisiveness by encouraging racism and
bigotry. 2 7 Addressing the forces behind the drive for English
monolingualism, two authors wrote:
Since early in the European colonization of North America,
the English language has been the dominant speech of those in
political and economic power. English monolingualism has
been encouraged by rewards of social approval and advance-
ment, promises of better jobs and higher wages, and awarding
U.S. citizenship. It has been enforced by ridicule, denial of ac-
cess to employment and education, confiscation of "foreign"
language presses and publications, and beatings of schoolchil-
dren for the use of other languages. Multilingualism has been
mistakenly perceived as a dangerous threat to national
unity.
1 2 8
Thus, opponents argue that a primary goal of U.S.ENGLISH is
to limit the political power of language minorities by denying
them benefits and rights. 129
[T]his amendment won't remedy any of the problems .... pointed out. It
won't help anyone learn the English language. It won't improve our soci-
ety. It won't lead to a more cohesive nation. In fact, it will create a more
divided nation. This amendment is an insult to all Americans for whom
English is not the first language .... I oppose this amendment because it
does nothing that it is supposed to do .... It won't create a better, stronger,
more cohesive American society.
131 CONG. REC. S11456 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1985).
126 Marshall Ingwerson, Push for Official English on Ballot in 3 States, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 27, 1988. at 5; Braj B. Kachru. American English and Other
Englishes, in LANGUAGE IN THE USA 21 (Charles A. Ferguson & Shirley Brice
Heath eds., 1981) (identifying English as the only universal language).
127 Gail D. Cox, Citizen Movement Seeks to Proclaim English 'Official'; A Matter
of Symbols, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 25, 1986, at 1, col. 2; Beers, supra note 106, at 4, col.
3; S.J. Res. 20, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REC. E2046 (daily ed. June 11,
1986) (statement of Arnoldo Torres, former director of the League of United Latin
American Citizens); Eloise Salholz & Daniel L. Gonzalez et al., Say it in English,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 20, 1989, at 23 ("English-only [laws] 'send[ ] a message that [non-
English speakers] cannot be trusted to become American like their ancestors did,
and their assimilation must be imposed by statute."') (quoting Geoffrey Nunberg,
Professor of Linguistics, Stanford University).
128 CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 30, at 157.
129 Califa, supra note 4, at 317, 328-29; see also Arington, supra note 64, at 342-51
(arguing that English-only laws should be narrowly interpreted because of concerns
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Proponents of the pro-English provisions view assimilation
into American society as Anglocization; however, many recent
immigrants refuse to accept Anglo culture as their primary cul-
ture.130 The American ideal of unity, E Pluribus Unum, does not
require the abrogation of native cultures for the sake of same-
ness.' 3 ' In fact, the original design for a Great Seal celebrated
this diversity by "propos[ing] that the seal should be engraved on
the obverse with a shield divided into six quarterings, symbol-
izing the six major lands of origin of the American people - Eng-
land, Scotland, Ireland, France, Germany, Holland . . . .The
motto was to be: E Pluribus Unum."'132 But while the phrase
"melting pot" has been used to describe the creation of a new
American character and culture, historically the term has more
accurately described efforts to require immigrants to conform to
British-American culture and behavior. 133
U.S.ENGLISH continues the tradition of discrimination and
coercion by preying on the anxiety created by the number of im-
migrants and the lack of tolerance for differences." 4 Monol-
regarding the process of direct legislation and the negative impact of this process on
language minority rights).
130 Cox, supra note 127, at 1. col. 2; Beers, supra note 106, at 4, col. 3. For a
discussion of the costs associated with assimilation, see Irving Howe, Toward An
Open Culture, NEw REPUBLIC, March 5, 1984, at 25, 27; ERNESTO GALARZA, BAR-
RIO Boy (1971) (autobiography describing the acculturation of a Mexican immigrant
to California); RICHARD RODRIQUEZ. HUNGER OF MEMORY: THE EDUCATION OF
RICHARD RODRIOUEZ (1982) (autobiography of a California-born Chicano leaving
his family); AMERICAN MOSAIC (Joan Morrison & Charlotte F. Zablusky eds., 1980)
(stories of the immigrant experience).
131 See Perea, supra note 34, at 275 ("[T]he phrase ... meant a union composed
of ethnically different peoples .... The American union did not mean eliminating
pluribus ....").
132 HORACE M. KALLEN, CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE AMERICAN IDEA 69
(1956); see also RICHARD S. PATTERSON & RICHARDSON DOUGALL, THE EAGLE
AND THE SHIELD: A HISTORY OF THE GREAT SEAL OF THE UNITED STATES 6-31
(1976) (describing the efforts of a committee composed of Thomas Jefferson, John
Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and the artist Du Simitiere).
133 Karst, supra note 8, at 312; MILTON M. GORDON. ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN
LIFE 84-114 (1964); Philip Gleason, American Identity and Americanization, in WIL-
LIAM PETERSEN, CONCEPTS OF ETHNICrrY 57, 80-96 (1982). More than 200 years
old, the melting pot metaphor derives from a letter written by an American farmer
in 1782: "Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men ...." J.
HECTOR ST. JOHN DE CREVECOEUR, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 39
(1957). The metaphor gained popular acceptance in 1908 with the performance of
Israel Zangwill's play, The Melting Pot: "America is God's Crucible, the great Melt-
ing-Pot where all the races of Europe are melting and re-forming!" ISRAEL
ZANGWILL, THE MELTING POT 100 (1910).
134 Beers, supra note 106, at 4, col. 5.
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inguals often fear languages they do not understand and oppose
the right to use languages other than their own. 135 As one com-
mentator has stated, "distrust of the members of a different cul-
tural group flows from fear, not just of the unknown but the fear
that outsiders threaten our own acculturated views of the natural
order of society."' 3 6 In particular, Spanish is often viewed as a
low-status language in the United States because of "the endur-
ing sentiment variously held by a number [of] Americans that
Spanish speakers are 'illiterate, impoverished, dirty, [and] back-
wards."1 3 7  Rather than promoting national unity, examples
from other countries demonstrate that declarations of an official
language foster divisiveness and ethnic discord. 138 The cultural
diversity from our rich mix of people should not be subjected to
the threats and prejudices of the official English proponents; in-
stead it should be celebrated for the benefit it provides our
nation.
Since English is universally recognized as the predominant lan-
guage in the United States, social and economic pressures re-
quire that all residents have a high level of proficiency in its
use.1 3 9 English acquisition is a necessity for success in education,
employment, and virtually all aspects of daily life:
135 Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23
Hous. L. REV. 885, 894-95 (1986); Mealey, supra note 92, at 390.
136 Karst, supra note 8, at 309; see EDWARD T. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE 35
(1973); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEGMENTED SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
MEANING OF AMERICA 172, 174-75 (1975) (comprehension of the expected behavior
of members of our own cultural group creates trust and acceptance); see also Fish-
man, supra note 8, at 133-34 ("anglo-oriented middle class Americans" fear the loss
of their political and social power to immigrants whose primary language is not
English).
137 Roseann D. Gonzalez et al., Language Rights and Mexican Americans: Much
Ado About Nothing (presented at Minority Language Rights and Minority Educa-
tion: European and North American Perspectives, Cornell University, May 6-9,
1983), reprinted in Hearings on H.J. Res. 13, H.J. Res. 33, H.J. Res. 60 & H.J. Res. 83,
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 181, 185 (May 11, 1988); see also CONKLIN & Lou-
RIE, supra note 30, at 159 ("[Tjhe prestige of a language derives from the social
status of its speakers, not from the language itself.").
138 Califa, supra note 4, at 322-23 (discussing the battle over languages in Canada,
Sri Lanka, and Belgium); see also R.F. Inglehart & M. Woodward, Language Con-
flicts and Political Community, in LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 358, 360 (Pier
P. Giglioni ed., 1972) ("The likelihood that linguistic division will lead to political
conflicts is particularly great when the language cleavages are linked with the pres-
ence of a dominant group which blocks the social mobility of members of a
subordinate group, partly, at least, on the basis of language factors.").
139 Piatt, supra note 135, at 898.
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Cultural and societal forces in the United Kingdom and the
United States, in particular, have pushed nonnative English
speakers who have come to these countries as immigrants, ref-
ugees, or migrant workers to learn English so that they might
move into the work force and achieve acceptance in the soci-
ety beyond their own communities. In modern times, no offi-
cial national-level policies mandate English; the status of
English has been achieved in these countries without official
declaration or the help of an official language academy. For
speakers of other languages, the primary mandate for English
has come from societal forces working on an individual's de-
sire to secure education and employment, move into English-
speaking social circles, and negotiate daily interactions with
the bureaucratic and commercial mainstream. 1
40
Despite the assertions of the proponents of official English provi-
sions, most non-English-speaking immigrants learn English and
speak it regularly.' 41 In fact, Spanish-speaking immigrants are
learning English as quickly as previous immigrant groups. 42
Studies demonstrate that native-born and immigrant Hispanics
whose first language is Spanish learn English at an impressive
rate. Hispanics follow the traditional three-generation model of
language acquisition in which the first generation is primarily
monolingual in Spanish; the second generation is bilingual; and
by the third generation the preferred language is English. 43 The
impression that Hispanic immigrants are not learning English is
caused instead by the steady rate of Hispanic immigrants."'
140 Shirley Brice Heath, Language Policies: Patterns of Retention and Mainte-
nance, in MEXICAN-AMERICANS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 259 (Walker Con-
nor ed., 1985).
141 Martha Jiminez, Official Use of English: Do We Need a Constitutional Amend-
ment?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at 35 (A 1988 study found that after fifteen years of
residency, approximately 75% of Hispanic immigrants speak English on a daily ba-
sis, and seven out of ten children of Hispanic parents become English-speaking for
all practical purposes. A 1985 Rand study found that 95% of first-generation His-
panics learn English, and all of their children are proficient in English).
142 Ingwerson, supra note 126, at 5; see KEVIN F. MCCARTHY & R. BURCIAGA
VALDEZ, CURRENT AND FUTURE EFFECTS OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN CALIFOR-
NIA (1986).
143 Jiminez, supra note 141, at 35; see CALVIN VELTMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE
SPANISH LANGUAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 44-45 (1988) (concluding that Hispanic
immigrants quickly shift to English); It's UnAmerican, supra note 121, at 35
("[T]here is little evidence that Spanish speakers cling to their language any more
fervently than did previous groups of immigrants."); see also Fishman, supra note 8,
at 129 (approximately 95 percent of Americans speak English).
144 Jeffrey Schmalz, Hispanic Influx Spurs 3 Ballots on Language, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 1988, at B8; Leibowicz, supra note 55, at 529; VELTMAN, supra note 143, at
109 (asserting that Spanish monolingualism persists because of continued immigra-
tion rather than because of a failure to learn English).
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The drive towards language restrictions also imposes grave
penalties on the nation's economic future. Monolingualism dis-
advantages individuals competing in the global marketplace, and
the United States urgently needs more English speakers who are
fluent in other languages. 145 In contrast to the United States, the
international population is comprised of predominantly bilingual
or multilingual societies. 46 Despite our limited ability to commu-
nicate with people from other nations, the number of students
studying foreign languages in the United States has dramatically
declined in the last two decades.' 47 Because of the paucity of
talented bilingual Americans, the State Department was forced
to eliminate the requirement that foreign-service candidates be
fluent in a second language.'48 In 1989 the Governors' Task
Force on International Education noted American students' lack
of foreign language ability and advocated that foreign language
instruction begin in the first grade.149 America's failure to pro-
duce fluent bilinguals is a "crippling factor" in dealing with other
nations in both international business and government
matters. 150
Congress has recognized and taken steps to remedy the perva-
sive discrimination faced by language minorities. For example, in
1975 Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to include lan-
guage minorities by requiring state and political subdivisions to
provide voting materials, instructions, and ballots "in the lan-
guage of the applicable language minority group as well as in the
English language.'' 1 5 Congress determined that "voting discrim-
145 Mealey, supra note 92, at 390 n.17; Vernon Walters. U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 15, 1985, at 31 ("The failure to communicate with foreigners in their own
language prevents them from understanding us as we really are. It makes it difficult
for us to project our real purposes to other people.").
146 CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 30, at 158.
147 Id. at 231.
148 George Gedda, Americans' Lack of Foreign-language Skills Makes It Hard to
Find Interpreters, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Jan. 8, 1989, at E4.
149 Donald M. Rothberg. Governors Urged to Push International Education, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Feb. 26, 1989, at A5. But see FRANSOIs GROS-
JEAN, LIFE WITH Two LANGUAGES 66 (1982) ("[Bjilingualism is treated as a stigma
and a liability in the United States, whereas in many European and African coun-
tries it is considered a great asset.").
150 Piatt, supra note 135, at 900.
151 Voting Rights Act of 1965-Extension, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4) (1982)). Materials must be pro-
vided when more than 5% of voting-age citizens are members of a single language
minority and illiteracy is higher than the national rate. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b)
(1994).
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ination against citizens of language minorities [was] pervasive
and national in scope. Such minority citizens are from environ-
ments in which the dominant language is other than English.' '1 52
Congress found that "[p]ersons of Spanish heritage [are] the
group most severely affected by discriminatory practices, while
the documentation [of discriminatory practices] concerning
Asian Americans .. .[is] substantial."' 53 But Congress limited
the definition of language minorities to persons of American In-
dian, Asian American, Alaskan Native, or Spanish heritage.151
Thus, protection extends only to language minorities who are
also racial and ethnic minorities. 55
Congress also enacted the Bilingual Education Act to help
fund bilingual projects designed to aid people with limited Eng-
lish abilities whose primary language is not English.' 56 Congress
noted that "there are large and growing numbers of children of
limited English proficiency[,] . .. many of [whom] . . .have a
cultural heritage which differs from that of English proficient
persons."' 57 Similarly, "many adults are not able to participate
fully in national life, and .. .limited English proficient parents
are often not able to participate effectively in their children's ed-
ucation." '158 The difficulty in fully participating in all aspects of
society was also recognized in the Department of Education reg-
ulations implementing the Act. 159
152 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1).
153S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 797.
15442 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(e) (1982).
155 Sandra Guerra, Voting Rights and the Constitution: The Disenfranchisement of
Non-English Speaking Citizens, 97 YALE L.J. 1419, 1422 n.21 (1988).
15620 U.S.C. §§ 3281-3341 (1988); see also Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Dis-
cretion: Federal Intervention in Bilingual Education, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1249, 1272-
1314 (1988) (discussing subsequent amendments and reauthorizations of the Bilin-
gual Education Act).
157 20 U.S.C. § 3282(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
158 Id. § 3282(a)(19); see also H.R. REP. No. 748, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4036, 4042.
159 34 C.F.R. § 500.4(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (1988); see also Perea, supra note 75, at 286-87;
Karst, supra note 8, at 354; H.R. REP. No. 748, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4036, 4039 ("The purpose of a bilingual program is to help chil-
dren enter an all-English class as soon as possible."); Josue M. Gonzalez, Coming of
Age in Bilingual/Bicultural Education: A Historical Perspective, 19 INEQUALITY IN
EDuc. 5 (1975) (summarizing various types of bilingual education); Iris C. Rotberg,
Some Legal and Research Considerations in Establishing Federal Policy in Bilingual
Education, 52 HARV. EDUC. REV. 149 (1982) (discussing the history of bilingual
education and the related literature); Ricardo Otheguy, Thinking About Bilingual
Education: A Critical Appraisal, 52 HARV. EDUC. REV. 301 (1982).
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Members of language minority groups are also protected
under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, which
prohibits states from denying equal educational opportunity to
individuals on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin. 160
This Act codified the Supreme Court's decision in Lau v. Nichols
which held that the San Francisco school system discriminated
against non-English speaking Chinese students on the basis of
national origin in violation of Title VI by failing to provide spe-
cial language instruction. 161 The Act also required states to pro-
vide special assistance to language minority students by "tak[ing]
appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede
equal participation by its students in its instructional pro-
grams. ' 162 Finally, the Court Interpreters Act requires federal
courts to provide interpreters for parties whose primary language
is not English. 16
3
II
NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION FRAMEWORK
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the main
source of protection against employment discrimination for lan-
guage minorities.164 Congress enacted Title VII in order to pro-
160 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1974).
161 Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
162 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f). The Equal Educational Opportunities Act further pro-
vides in relevant part:
No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on ac-
count of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by ... (f) the failure
by an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language
barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional
programs.
Id.
163 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1988).
164 Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) states in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
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mote equal employment opportunities and conditions by
prohibiting consideration of improper qualifications and remov-
ing barriers that favored white males. 65 Yet Congress failed to
define the term "national origin" when it enacted Title VII.
Although Title VII inspired what has been referred to as the
"longest debate" in Senate history,166 the legislative history re-
garding the term "national origin" is limited.167 During the con-
gressional debates, Representative Roosevelt (D. Cal.)
attempted to provide a definition by stating, "May I just make
very clear that 'national origin' means national. It means the
country from which you or your forebears come from. You may
come from Poland, Czechoslovakia, England, France, or any
other country.' 1 68 In the discussion of Congress' understanding
that national origin could in some instances be a bona fide occu-
pational qualification, Representative Roosevelt noted:
[T]here was evidence brought out before the committee of
certain instances where labor unions that deal with a particular
language group had to have and had to be able to hire to work
with people who were able to speak the particular language
used by the people of a certain national origin. Therefore, it
was felt in order not to restrict their activity that quite prop-
erly they should be allowed to do that. 69
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
165 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (discussing the
purpose of Title VII). In response to a question regarding interference with an em-
ployer's right to hire based on qualifications, Senator Clark, the Senate Floor Man-
ager, replied: "To discriminate is to make distinctions or differences in the treatment
of employees, and [such distinctions] are prohibited only if they are based on any of
the five forbidden criteria (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); any other
criteria or qualification is untouched by this bill." 110 CONG. REc. 7218 (1964).
166 See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acr (1985).
167 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973) (characterizing the legis-
lative history as "quite meager"). For a discussion of the term "national origin" in
executive and legislative action prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see Perea,
supra note 84, at 810-17.
168 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964), reprinted in UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND IX OF
CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 3179-80 (1968); see also BARBARA LINDEMANN
SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 305 (2d ed. 1983)
("Congress intended to include within the category 'national origin' members of all
national groups and groups of persons of common ancestry, heritage, or
background.").
169 110 CONG. REC. 2550 (1964). Note that Rep. Roosevelt's statement recognizes
the connection between language and national origin. But see Perea, supra note 84,
at 819 n.80 (warning about attributing too much significance to the comment be-
cause the focus of the legislation was racial discrimination).
OREGON LAW REVIEW
Representative Dent (D. Pa.) added to the definition: "National
origin, of course, has nothing to do with color, religion, or the
race of an individual. A man may have migrated here from
Great Britain and still be a colored person. ' 170 Congress deleted
"ancestry" from the final version of the Act because the word
was considered synonymous with "national origin.' 17 1
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
broadly defines national origin as the place of origin of one's an-
cestors.1 72 Under the EEOC guidelines, national origin discrimi-
nation is defined as the denial of employment due to "an
individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because
an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics
of a national origin group.' 73 The guidelines recognize an indi-
vidual's primary language as an essential characteristic of his or
her national origin.17 4
The EEOC was created as part of Title VII and given responsi-
bility for administering the Act.175 When originally established
in 1964, the EEOC had authority to receive and investigate
charges of discrimination and resolve them through conciliation,
but it lacked significant enforcement power. 176  Congress
amended Title VII in 1972 to grant the EEOC authority to bring
civil suits for unlawful employment practices. 177 The EEO Act
thus created a quasi-judicial agency with enforcement power to
implement the policies underlying Title VII. The EEOC was also
authorized to issue procedural guidelines. 178  Although the
EEOC is not explicitly authorized to issue interpretive guide-
170 SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 168, at 305.
171 Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88-89.
17229 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1995).
173 Id. This protection also extends to spouses and people associated with individ-
uals who possess these characteristics. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(a)-(d) (1995) (protecting
spouses, associates of members of national origin groups, members of organizations
identified with national origin groups, persons who attend churches or schools used
by a national origin group, and individuals who are associated with those having
foreign-sounding surnames).
174 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1995).
175 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982).
176 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (1970); see UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL
RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 3258-72 (1968).
177 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(6) (permitting EEOC "to intervene in a civil action
brought under section 2000e-5 of this title by an aggrieved party against a
respondent").
178 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1982) ("The Commission shall have authority from
time to time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations .... ").
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lines, the Supreme Court has recognized such authority. 179 In
the 1970 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Ori-
gin, the _tEUL provided examples of actions constituting na-
tional origin discrimination, including using tests in English when
English is not the test taker's first language and denying employ-
ment because a person's name reflects a certain national
origin.180
In the only Supreme Court decision directly defining the term
"national origin," Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., the
Court stated that national origin refers to the place where one
was born or the country from which one's ancestors came, but
not the country of one's citizenship.' 8' In Espinoza, the Court
held that the company did not discriminate on the basis of Ms.
Espinoza's national origin when it refused to hire her because of
her Mexican citizenship.182 The Court found that the original
EEOC guidelines equating citizenship with national origin were
inconsistent with congressional intent. 183 Because Congress did
not eliminate the practice of requiring citizenship for federal em-
ployees, the Court reasoned that Congress could not have in-
tended to equate citizenship with national origin."8 In dissent,
Justice Douglas agreed with the EEOC's position that "[r]efusing
to hire an individual because he is an alien 'is discrimination
based on birth outside the United States and is thus discrimina-
179 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) ("The EEOC Guide-
lines are not administrative 'regulations' promulgated pursuant to formal procedures
established by the Congress. But, as this Court has heretofore noted, they do consti-
tute '[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency,' and
consequently they are 'entitled to great deference."') (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); see also MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION LAW § 5.02, at 200 (1988).
180 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(b) (1971) ("Title VII is intended to eliminate covert as well
as the overt practices of discrimination . . . where persons . . .have been denied
equal employment opportunity for reasons which are grounded in national origin
considerations.").
181 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973). While the Court ap-
peared to equate "ethnic discrimination" with "national origin discrimination" in
other cases, the cases lack significant explanation of the terms. See, e.g., Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 328-29, 338 n.19 (1977) (in a
lawsuit brought on behalf of Blacks and Spanish-surnamed individuals, the Court
referred to "racial and ethnic discrimination"); East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 398-99, 405 (1977) (in a suit by Mexican-American individ-
uals alleging race or national origin discrimination, the Court referred to an allega-
tion of "ethnic discrimination").
182 Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 95-96.
183 Id. at 89-91.
184 Id.
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tion based on national origin in violation of Title VII." ' 18 5 After
this decision, the EEOC revised its guidelines, stating that dis-
crimination on the basis of citizenship is not per se national ori-
gin discrimination.1 16 Some lower federal courts have extended
this definition of "national origin" to include an individual's an-
cestry despite the lack of a national affiliation. 18 7
B. Section 1981 and National Origin Discrimination Claims
Members of language minority groups may also seek protec-
tion from employment discrimination under the Civil Rights Act
of 1870, which provides a remedy against employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of race.188 In contrast to Title VII, which
reaches only employers of fifteen individuals or more, section
1981 does not contain a statutory minimum.189 While an em-
ployee may seek relief under both Title VII and section 1981 for
racial discrimination by a private employer, section 1981 may be
used by an employee of the federal government only in the lim-
ited cases when discrimination in federal employment is not cov-
ered by Title VII. 190 In addition, section 1981 requires proof of
purposeful or intentional discrimination, which is established
185 Id. at 97-98 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Commission as Amicus
Curiae). See also Perea, supra note 84, at 824 ("The plain meaning of the statutory
language... and its meager legislative history... easily could have been interpreted
to prevent discrimination against a legal alien.").
186 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(d) (1974).
187 See, e.g., Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that Serbians can claim national origin protection although Serbia did not
exist as a nation at the time the lawsuit was filed); Janko v. Illinois State Toll High-
way Auth., 704 F. Supp. 1531, 1532 (N.D. 111. 1989) (holding that Gypsies can claim
national origin protection); Roach v. Dresser Indus. Valve & Instrument Div., 494 F.
Supp. 215, 218 (W.D. La. 1980) (holding that Acadians ["Cajuns"] can claim na-
tional origin protection). But see Perea, supra note 84, at 831, 860-62 (stating that a
broad interpretation by the courts or the EEOC is not supported by the statutory
language or legislative history; because of the current Supreme Court's strict con-
struction of civil rights statutes, Professor Perea argues that Title VII should be
amended to bar discrimination on the basis of ethnic traits).
188 The Civil Rights Act of 1870 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right ... to make and enforce contracts, sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishments, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).18 9 SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 168, at 669 & n.11.
190 See Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976) (holding that
section 717 of Title VII provides "the exclusive judicial remedy" for federal employ-
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under the same standards applied in the Title VII context.' 91
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in St. Francis College v.
Al-Khazraji,92 the majority of courts held that ethnicity and na-
tional origin were not per se prohibited bases of discrimination
under section 1981.193 The Supreme Court held in Al-Khazraji,
however, that section 1981 protects identifiable classes of persons
who were subject to intentional discrimination based solely on
their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. 194 Based on an examina-
tion of nineteenth century dictionaries and encyclopedias as well
as the statute's legislative history, the Court determined that the
term "race" referred not only to distinct ethnic groups such as
Jews and Gypsies, but also included nationalities such as Swedes,
Greeks, Hungarians, Italians, and Mexicans. 195  The Court
agreed with the Third Circuit's determination that "§ 1981, 'at a
minimum,' reache[d] discrimination against an individual 'be-
cause he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiog-
nomically distinctive subgrouping of homo sapiens.'"'196 Noting
that a distinctive physiognomy was not essential for section 1981
ees). The Eleventh Amendment provides sovereign immunity protection for state
entities. SCHLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 168, at 674 & n.16.
191 General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386-88 (1982);
see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co. 427 U.S. 273 (1976); PLAYER, supra note
179, at 616.
192 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
193 See, e.g., Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir.
1981) ("Section 1981 only prohibits racial discrimination" and does not apply to a
Caucasian of East Indian descent.); Gutierrez v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 22
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 447, 449 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (stating that recovery is not
available for § 1981 discrimination based solely on national origin); Barbre v. Gar-
land Indep. Sch. Dist., 474 F. Supp. 687, 700 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (stating that § 1981
only prohibits racial discrimination and does not include other categories); Foreman
v. General Motors Corp., 473 F. Supp. 166, 177 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (stating in dictum
that § 1981 does not cover claims of national origin discrimination); Gomez v. Pima
County, 426 F. Supp. 816, 819 (D. Ariz. 1976) (stating that Mexican-Americans can-
not sue under § 1981 if alleged discrimination based solely on national origin). But
see Harris v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 616 F.2d 377, 378 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating in dictum
that § 1981 covered national origin discrimination); Sud v. Import Motors Ltd., 379
F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (stating that § 1981 covered national origin
discrimination).
194 481 U.S. at 613. In the case, an associate professor, who was a U.S. citizen
born in Iraq, was denied tenure. He then alleged violations of §§ 1981, 1983,
1985(3), 1986, Title VII and state laws. The district court granted summary judgment
for the college on the § 1981 claim; the other claims were dismissed as untimely or
for want of state action. 523 F. Supp. 386 (W.D. Pa. 1981). The Third Circuit re-
versed the dismissal of the § 1981 claim. 784 F.2d 505 (3rd Cir. 1986).
195 Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 610-13.
196 Id. at 613.
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protection, the Court concluded that "[i]f respondent on remand
can prove that he was subjected to intentional discrimination
based on the fact that he was born an Arab, rather than solely on
the place or nation of his origin, or his religion, he will have
made out a case under § 1981.' 9  In his concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Brennan noted that "the line between discrimination based
on 'ancestry or ethnic characteristics'. . . and discrimination
based on 'place or nation of ... origin'.., is not a bright one.'
19 8
While an individual's ancestry (the ethnic group from which an
individual or his ancestors are descended) is not necessarily iden-
tical with the individual's national origin, the two are often iden-
tical as a factual matter. 199 Brennan also noted that the terms
overlap in the Title VII context, citing as authority the EEOC
definition of national origin discrimination.2"' He concluded by
interpreting the Court's opinion as stating only that "discrimina-
tion based on birthplace alone is insufficient to state a claim
under § 1981."'2°1 In subsequent cases, courts have also noted the
lack of any substantive difference between national origin and
ancestry and ethnicity, thus extending the reach of national ori-
gin protection under § 1981.202
C. The First Amendment and Official English Provisions
Some recent amendments to state constitutions restricting the
use of non-English languages have conflicted with the First
Amendment rights of public employees. In a recent decision, the
197 Id. For a criticism of the Court's distinction between national origin as place
of birth and race as including ancestry and ethnicity, see Rachel R. Munafo, Na-
tional Origin Discrimination Revisited, 34 CATH. LAW. 271, 275-76 (1991).




202 See, e.g., Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1308 (7th Cir. 1989)
("Although the parties describe the charge as one of racial discrimination, it is more
accurately described as a charge of discrimination based on color, ethnicity, or na-
tional origin, rather than on race, since Indians are Caucasians. But the precise
characterization makes no difference in this case."); MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856
F.2d 1054, 1060 (8th Cir. 1988) ("In some cases, the distinction between a § 1981
claimant's race and his national origin may prevent an adverse judgment .... In
[this] case, however, this appears to be a difference without significance."); Nieto v.
United Auto Workers Local 598, 672 F. Supp. 987, 989 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("[A]
person of Mexican descent who was born in Poland could be discriminated against
because he was born in Poland without violating 1981, but not because his ancestors
were Mexican. As a practical matter... there is no longer a distinction for purposes
of 1981 between race and national origin based discrimination.").
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Article 28 of the Ari-
zona Constitution, which declared English the official state lan-
guage and provided that state and political subdivisions,
including all government officials and employees performing
government business, must "act" only in English, violated the
First Amendment and constituted a prohibited means of promot-
ing the English language.20 3 The plaintiff, who was fluent in Eng-
lish and Spanish, was employed by the Arizona Department of
Administration processing medical malpractice claims asserted
against the state. Prior to the passage of the amendment, she
communicated in Spanish with monolingual Spanish-speaking
claimants and in a combination of English and Spanish with bilin-
gual claimants. Because state employees are subject to employ-
ment sanctions if they fail to obey the Arizona Constitution, Ms.
Yniguez stopped using Spanish at work. She then filed an action
seeking an injunction against state enforcement of the amend-
ment and a declaration that the article violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments as well as federal civil rights laws.
First, noting that eighteen states had adopted "official-Eng-
lish" laws, the Ninth Circuit characterized Arizona's as "by far
the most restrictively worded official-English law to date. 20 4
While the official-English laws in many other states are merely
symbolic, the court determined that Arizona's provision "broadly
203 Yniguez v. Arizonans For Official English. 42 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (9th Cir.
1994), reh'g granted, 53 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1995). Article 28 provides in relevant
part:
Section 1.(1) The English language is the official language of the State of
Arizona.
(2) As the official language of this State, the English language is the lan-
guage of ... all government functions and actions.
(3)(a) This Article applies to:
(i) the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government[,]
(ii) all political subdivisions, departments, agencies, organizations, and in-
strumentalities of this State, including local governments and municipalities
(iv) all government officials and employees during the performance of gov-
ernment business.
Section 2. This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall take all
reasonable steps to preserve, protect and enhance the role of the English
language as the official language of the State of Arizona ....
Section 3.(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2):
(a) This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English
and in no other language.
ARIZ. CONST. art. 28, §§ 1-3.
204 Yniguez, 42 F.3d at 1224 (quoting Arington, supra note 64, at 337).
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prohibits all government officials and employees from speaking
languages other than English in performing their official duties,
save to the extent that the use of non-English languages is per-
mitted pursuant to the provision's narrow exceptions section. 20 5
The court determined that the provision's broad language was
facially invalid because it applies to speech in a myriad of set-
tings, including "ministerial statements by civil servants . . .
teachers speaking in the classroom .... town-hall discussions be-
tween constituents and their representatives [and] the translation
of judicial proceedings in the courtroom . . . . [U]niversities
would be barred from issuing diplomas in Latin, and judges per-
forming weddings would be prohibited from saying 'Mazel Tov
.... 206 The court rejected the defendants' contention that an
individual's choice of language involved expressive conduct
rather than pure speech concerns. While recognizing that a bilin-
gual person makes an expressive choice when choosing a lan-
guage, the court stated that language by definition is speech, and
the choice of specific words and language affects both the
message and the ability to make oneself understood.20 7
Although the government has greater freedom in regulating the
speech of its employees than the speech of private citizens, par-
ticularly when the regulation relates to the government's interest
in efficient and effective performance of its functions, greater
protection is provided to speech which the public desires to
hear.2°8 By prohibiting the exchange of public information in the
most readily comprehensible language for some members of the
public, the provision "obstructs the free flow of information and
adversely affects the rights of many private persons by requiring
the incomprehensible to replace the intelligible. ' 20 9 Thus, the re-
striction on public employee speech obstructs Arizona's interest
in efficiency and effectiveness since the use of Spanish or other
non-English languages positively contributes to the administra-
205 Id. at 1228. In making this determination, the court rejected the Arizona At-
torney General's construction that the article applied only to "official acts" of state
governmental entities, and that languages other than English could be used "when
reasonable to facilitate the day-to-day operation of government." Id. at 1225 (quot-
ing Op. Att'y. Gen. No. 189-009 (1989)).
206 Id. at 1229.
207 Id. at 1231.
208 Id. at 1234-35. Citing long-standing Supreme Court precedent, the court de-
clared that prohibitions on public employee speech "may not be justified by the
simple assertion that the government is the employee's employer." Id. at 1234.
209 Id. at 1237.
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tion of the State. The court noted, however, that a public em-
ployee does not have an absolute right to speak in another
language, so the state could restrict inappropriate language when
it would hinder job performance.21 °
The court next rejected the argument that Article XXVIII pro-
motes significant state interests in protecting democracy by "en-
couraging 'unity and political stability'; encouraging a common
language; and protecting public confidence."'21  Although recog-
nizing the importance of the first two interests, the court deter-
mined that the provision was an unfair, ineffective, and
inappropriate means of promoting them, and that the substantial
adverse effect on First Amendment rights outweighed the
goals.212 The court declared that "the state cannot achieve unity
by prescribing orthodoxy," noting with approval the plaintiff's ar-
gument in Meyer v. Nebraska that "forced 'Americanization' vio-
lates the American tradition of liberty and toleration. ' 213 In
addition, the court found that the coercive proscription of non-
English languages did nothing to promote English, and the mea-
sure inhibits rather than promotes public confidence in the effec-
tive and efficient administration of the state's business.214 In
conclusion, the court noted that the adverse impact of the provi-
sion was especially egregious because it fell almost entirely upon
Hispanics and other national origin minorities. 215 Emphasizing
the prejudices and fears behind the official-English laws, the
court stated that "[s]ince language is a close and meaningful
proxy for national origin, restrictions on the use of languages
may mask discrimination against specific national origin groups
or, more generally, conceal nativist sentiment. 21 6 Because the
diverse and multicultural character of our society exists as one of
the nation's greatest strengths, statutes should not attempt to
2 10 Id. at 1238.
211 Id. at 1239.
212 Id. at 1240-41. The court relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in Meyer v.
Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (discussed supra note 68) and Farrington v.
Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (finding that the promotion of similar interests was
insufficient to justify infringement on the right to educate one's children in one's
mother tongue, and the repressive means adopted to encourage English acquisition
were arbitrary and invalid).
213 Yniguez, 42 F.2d at 1241 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 392).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1241 (citing Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486, reh'g denied,
13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct 2726 (1994) (an "English-only rule
in the workplace may disproportionately affect Hispanic employees")).
216 Id. at 1241-42 (footnote omitted).
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compel immigrants to give up their native languages, but should
instead encourage and provide opportunities for the acquisition
of English proficiency.217
D. The Immigration Reform and Control Act
In 1965, Congress repealed immigration laws which favored
European over Asian and Hispanic immigrants.218 The repeal of
these laws, combined with the political turmoil in Latin America
and Southeast Asia, resulted in a massive increase in the number
of immigrants from these regions. This rapid rise in non-Euro-
pean immigrants increased the call for immigration restrictions
by groups such as the Federation for American Immigration Re-
form (FAIR). 2 19 Evidencing the relationship between the official
English movement and anti-immigrant policies is the founding of
FAIR by one of the leaders of the official English movement and
co-founder of U.S.ENGLISH, Dr. John Tanton. 220 The founder
217 Id. at 1242. See also Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of S.E. Judicial Dist., 838
F.2d 1031, 1044 n.19 reh'g en banc denied, 861 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as
moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989), in which the Ninth Circuit recognized that serious con-
stitutional questions would arise if an English-only rule forbade communication in
Spanish with non-English speaking members of the public.
218 Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1152).
219 DAVID H. BENNETT, THE PARTY OF FEAR, FROM NATIVIST MOVEMENT TO
THE NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 363-72 (1988).
220 Califa, supra note 4, at 300. In an infamous paper, Dr. Tanton revealed the
true motives of his efforts with U.S.ENGLISH and expressed his fears about His-
panic immigration:
Gobernar es poblar translates 'to govern is to populate.' In this society
where the majority rules, does this hold? Will the present majority peacea-
bly hand over its political power to a group that is simply more fertile?
Can homo contraceptivus [sic] compete with homo progenitiva [sic] if bor-
ders aren't controlled? Or is advice to limit one's family simple advice to
move over and let someone else with greater reproductive powers occupy
the space.
Will Latin American migrants bring with them the tradition of the
mordida (bribe), the lack of involvement in public affairs, etc.?
What are the differences in educability [sic] between Hispanics (with
their 50% dropout rate) and Asiatics [sic] (with their excellent school
records and long tradition of scholarship)?
In the California of 2030, the non Hispanic Whites and Asians will own
the property, have the good jobs and education, speak one language and be
mostly Protestant and 'other.' The Blacks and Hispanics will have the poor
jobs, will lack education, own little property, speak another language and
will be mainly Catholic.
Memorandum from John Tanton to WITAN IV Attendees (Oct. 10, 1986), quoted in
Califa, supra note 4, at 326-27 nn. 215-22.
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of English First, Lawrence Pratt, also served as the secretary of
the Council for Inter-American Security, which, in 1985, pub-
lished a report identifying Hispanics who support bilingual edu-
cation as a national security risk.22'
Reflecting a shift in immigration policy, the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) made it unlawful for em-
ployers to hire undocumented or unauthorized aliens.222 IRCA
has three major provisions: a legalization program to provide
temporary permanent resident status and ultimately permanent
resident status to undocumented individuals;223 employer sanc-
tions;224 and anti-discrimination provisions. 225  Section 102 of
IRCA prohibits discrimination in the hiring, recruitment or dis-
charge of an employee on the basis of national origin or citizen-
ship status, unless the employer employs three or fewer
employees, the victim is covered by Title VII, or the discrimina-
tion is necessary to comply with federal, state, local, or other
laws.22 6 Aliens newly legalized under IRCA's amnesty provi-
sions must demonstrate a "minimal understanding of ordinary
English" in order to become permanent residents.227 Similarly,
naturalized citizenship status requires literacy in English, and ad-
mission requires a demonstration of literacy.228
While IRCA has failed to eliminate illegal immigration, the
221 R.E. BUTLER, ON CREATING A HISPANIC AMERICA: A NATION WITHIN A NA-
TION? 9-13 (1985); Califa, supra note 4, at 299-300.
222 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(a), 1324a (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
223 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
224 This provision makes it unlawful for a person or entity knowingly "(1)(A) to
hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien
knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.., with respect to such employment," or
"(2)... to continue to employ the alien in the United States knowing the alien is (or
has become) an unauthorized alien with respect to such employment." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(a)(1)-(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Employers must verify employment eligi-
bility and identification with specific documents for every employee. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(b).
225 These provisions categorize unfair immigration related employment practices
in order to protect citizens and authorized workers from discrimination based on
citizenship, protected individual status, or national origin. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)(3)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Employers
with fewer than four employees are not subject to these anti-discrimination provi-
sions. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(A).
226 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(C). An aggrieved party must first file for relief under
Title VII or section 1981 if covered by those provisions. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(B).
In addition, employers may discriminate on the basis of citizenship when the candi-
dates are "equally qualified." 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(4).
227 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(1)(D)(i) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
228 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (1988); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(25) (1988).
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Act has created new forms of discrimination as well as an in-
crease in discrimination against ethnic minorities, particularly
Hispanic and Asian.229 The discriminatory practices have in-
cluded refusing to hire applicants who appear to be "foreign" or
have an accent, applying the verification requirements only to
applicants who appear "foreign" or have an accent, and hiring
only United States citizens or green card holders.23 ° In testimony
before a congressional subcommittee, advocates supporting the
repeal of employer sanctions cited the following reports:
A U.S. General Accounting Office study in 1990 found that
employer sanctions provisions caused 'a widespread pattern of
discrimination' against Asians, Latinos and other minorities
who are viewed as foreigners.
A 1992 NYC Human Rights commission report found that
52 percent of employers asking for work authorization before
hiring use foreign accent or appearance as an excuse to en-
force immigration laws discriminantly.
A 1989 survey of San Francisco businesses found that 50
percent of employers felt it was risking a fine or penalty under
IRCA to hire someone who spoke limited English, although
they had legal documents to work in the United States.231
In order to comply with the law, many employers have engaged
in employment practices which adversely affect citizens and
work-authorized immigrants who look or sound foreign by sub-
jecting them to greater scrutiny.232
229 Espenoza, supra note 9, at 344, 368; UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF
DISCRIMINATION 6 (1990) (National origin discrimination resulting from IRCA
amounts to more than just a "few isolated cases" and constitutes a "serious pattern
of discrimination.").
230 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 229, at 41-43.
231 Espenoza, supra note 9, at 348 n.42; see also Employment Discrimination and
Immigration Reform: Hearing on HR 1510 Before the Subcommittee on Employment
Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 41, 42 (1983) ("Although the proposed transitional employee verification sys-
tem purports to reduce the probability of employment discrimination, in practical
application, it could engender increased discrimination."). Senator Kennedy stated:
"[T]here continues to be evidence that Hispanic and Asian Americans 'are being
required by fearful employers to produce documents which are never required of
other Americans-and if they fail to comply they are denied the jobs."' Id. Compa-
nies also turn away "'anyone who looks foreign"' in order to avoid problems with
the INS. Immigration, Senate Immigration Panel Hears Views on Repealing Em-
ployer Sanctions, Daily Rep. For Executives (BNA) No. 66, at A-11 (Apr. 6, 1992).
232 CECILIA MUNOZ, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:
THE IMMIGRATION AND REFORM CONTROL ACT OF 1986, 38-41 (1990); Charles D.
Smith & Juan E. Mendez, Employer Sanctions and Other Labor Market Restrictions
[Vol. 74, 1995]
Nativism and Workplace Language Restrictions
III
EEOC AND JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF WORKPLACE
ENGLISH-ONLY RULES
While courts tend to adopt a more restrictive definition,2 33 the
EEOC broadly defines national origin discrimination as includ-
ing "the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an
individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because
an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics
of a national origin group. '2 34 The EEOC Guidelines create a
presumption that rules requiring employees to speak English at
all times in the workplace constitute national origin discrimina-
tion in violation of Title VII.2 35 However, the EEOC Guidelines
do permit an employer to impose limited language restrictions if
justified by a business necessity.236 If an employer institutes such
a rule, the employer must notify the employees of the general
circumstances when English is required and the consequences of
violating the rule.237
In the first federal court decision to address the issue of work-
place English-only rules, the court recognized the disparate im-
pact such rules have on members of a language minority
23group. 38 Brothers Well Service operated "workover rigs" which
on Alien Employment: The "Scorched Earth" Approach to Immigration Control, 6
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 19, 58 (1980).
233 See, e.g.. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1113 (1981) (discussed infra notes 243-249 and accompanying text).
234 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1995).
235 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1995) (footnote omitted). The text of this Guideline
states:
When applied at all times. A rule requiring employees to speak only Eng-
lish at all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition of
employment. The primary language of an individual is often an essential
national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in the
workplace, from speaking their primary language or the language they
speak most comfortably, disadvantages an individual's employment oppor-
tunities on the basis of national origin. It may also create an atmosphere of
inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on national origin which could
result in a discriminatory working environment. Therefore, the Commis-
sion will presume that such a rule violates Title VII and will closely scruti-
nize it.
Id.
236 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) ("An employer may have a rule requiring that employ-
ees speak only in English at certain times where the employer can show that the rule
is justified by business necessity.").
237 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c).
238 Saucedo v. Brothers Well Service, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
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are placed over oil wells with declining production to reclaim the
remaining oil. Fifty percent of the employees were Mexican-
American. Mr. Saucedo, a bilingual Mexican-American, was in-
formed that the shop supervisor did not permit any "Mexican
talk." The shop supervisor discharged Mr. Saucedo for violating
the English-only rule when Saucedo brought a part to a coworker
in the shop and asked in Spanish where to place it. When the
coworker challenged the discharge, the shop supervisor assaulted
the coworker. Neither the coworker nor shop supervisor were
reprimanded. The court held that Saucedo was disciminatorily
discharged because of racial animus, and it awarded him back
pay and attorney fees.239 While the supervisor and coworker
were not disciplined for fighting, Saucedo was dismissed for vio-
lating an unwritten rule that he was not aware was a company
policy enforced by immediate discharge. Although the court did
not decide the case on the basis of disparate impact analysis, the
court stated the following with regard to English-only rules:
A rule that Spanish cannot be spoken on the job obviously has
a disparate impact upon Mexican-American employees. Most
Anglo-Americans obviously have no desire and no ability to
speak foreign languages on or off the job. The question in a
case of this nature therefore becomes whether or not the em-
ployer can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his
"rule" requiring only English to be spoken on the job is the
result of business necessity.240
The court ruled that credible evidence did not show that the
company had and enforced an English-only policy, and the com-
pany also failed to show that speaking two Spanish words created
a danger or caused a failure of communication. 24 However, the
court stated in dicta that "a duly and officially promulgated ...
rule absolutely prohibiting the speaking of a foreign language
during the drilling of a well or the reworking of a well, and pro-
viding for immediate discharge for violation of the rule, would be
a reasonable rule for which a business necessity could be
demonstrated. 242
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has determined that an English-
only policy does not violate Title VII on the basis of national




242 Id. at 921.
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origin discrimination.243 Hector Garcia was a bilingual native-
born American of Mexican descent employed as a salesman by
Gloor Lumber & Supply, Inc. The owner instituted a rule
prohibiting employees from speaking Spanish on the job unless
conversing with a Spanish-speaking customer. The employees
were permitted to speak Spanish during breaks and other free
time. Employees who worked exclusively in the lumber yard
away from the public were permitted to speak Spanish at all
times. The rule was promulgated because of the owner's belief
that customers objected to communications they could not com-
prehend, the rule would improve the employees' English, and it
would permit improved supervision. Thirty-one of the thirty-
nine employees and seven of the eight salespeople were His-
panic. Mr. Garcia was discharged when he addressed another
salesman in Spanish.244
In rejecting Garcia's claim that the English-only policy consti-
tuted national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII, the
Fifth Circuit determined that national origin is not equated with
the language one chooses to speak.245 The statute does not grant
a right allowing an employee to speak a particular language at
work. Instead, national origin discrimination occurs when a com-
pany imposes prohibitions "that are . . . beyond the victim's
power to alter. ' 246 Therefore, when an employee has the capac-
ity to speak more than one language, it does not exceed the em-
ployee's ability to speak the one required by the employer. 247
In response to Garcia's claim that the rule had a discriminatory
impact on a protected class of employees, the court stated:
The EEO Act does not support an interpretation that equates
the language an employee prefers to use with his national ori-
gin. To a person who speaks only one tongue or to a person
who has difficulty using another language than the one spoken
in his home, language might well be an immutable characteris-
tic like skin color, sex or place of birth. However, the lan-
guage a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a
particular time is by definition a matter of choice.
2?a8
243 Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981).
244 Although the primary reason for his dismissal was the breach of the English-
only rule, other stated reasons included a failure to keep his inventory current, re-
plenish stock, and maintain a clean work area. Id. at 266.
245 Id. at 268.
246 Id. at 269.
247 Id. at 270.
248 Id.
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The court thus left open the possibility that an English-only rule
might constitute national origin discrimination if an employee
could only speak a language other than English. For a bilingual
employee, however, "nonobservance is a matter of individual
preference. 249
Due to the large number of Asians and Hispanics on the West
Coast, many of the English-only cases have been addressed by
the Ninth Circuit. In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., a radio disc-
jockey, who was bilingual in Spanish and English and of Mexi-
can-American and Native-American descent, began to use Span-
ish words and phrases in an effort to attract Hispanic listeners.
When this effort failed to increase the Hispanic audience, he was
told to stop speaking Spanish on the air. After he was termi-
nated for continuing to speak Spanish, the disc-jockey claimed
disparate treatment, disparate impact, and retaliatory discharge.
The Ninth Circuit found no evidence of discriminatory intent re-
quired for a claim of disparate treatment because the English-
only rule was promulgated due to marketing and ratings reasons
rather than racial motivation or national origin discrimination.25 °
The court stated: "An employer can properly enforce a limited,
reasonable and business-related English-only rule against an em-
ployee who can readily comply with the rule and who voluntarily
chooses not to observe it as 'a matter of individual prefer-
ence."' 25 1 Following the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, the court
found no disparate impact because Mr. Jurado was fluently bilin-
gual and could easily comply with the rule.252
After the promulgation of the EEOC Guidelines, the Ninth
Circuit recognized the relationship between language and na-
tional origin and determined that English-only rules do have a
disparate impact on language minority groups.253 A municipal
court instituted a rule requiring all employees to speak only Eng-
249 Id.
250 Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987).
251 Id. (citation omitted).
252 Id. The court also determined that Mr. Jurado did not establish a prima facie
case of retaliatory discharge because he was not engaging in protected activity and
his discharge was not in retaliation for such activity. Mr. Jurado opposed the rule for
personal reasons rather than because of concerns regarding discrimination against
Hispanics. Id.
253 Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of S.E. Judicial Dist., 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.
1988). Because Ms. Gutierrez was no longer employed by the municipal court, the
Supreme Court vacated the decision as moot and determined that the findings had
no precedential authority.
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lish at work, except during lunch and other breaks and when they
were translating for persons not fluent in English. This restric-
tion included bilingual clerks whose duties required working with
members of the public who spoke only Spanish. In response to
Ms. Gutierrez's claim that the rule constituted racial and national
origin discrimination in violation of Title VII, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the decision to issue a preliminary injunction barring
enforcement of the rule by following the EEOC guidelines and
determining that the rule had a disparate impact on Hispanics.254
The court stated:
We agree that English-only rules generally have an adverse
impact on protected groups and that they should be closely
scrutinized. We also agree that such rules can "create an at-
mosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation."..... Fi-
nally, we agree that such rules can readily mask an intent to
discriminate on the basis of national origin.255
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit noted that language is a signifi-
cant aspect of an individual's national origin, stating that "[t]he
cultural identity of certain minority groups is tied to the use of
their primary tongue. '"256 An individual's "primary language re-
mains an important link to his ethnic culture and identity. The
primary language not only conveys certain concepts, but is itself
an affirmation of that culture. ' 257 Thus, "[t]he mere fact that an
employee is bilingual does not eliminate the relationship be-
254 1d. at 1045.
255 id. at 1040 (citation omitted).
256 Id. at 1039 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit and other courts have also
recognized the close relationship between an individual's accent and national origin.
An employer may not discriminate against an employee with a foreign accent when
the accent does not materially interfere with the employee's job performance. Thus,
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason must exist for a "no foreign accent" rule.
See Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990) (stating that "[alccent and national origin are obviously
inextricably intertwined in many cases"); see also Carino v. University of Okla. Bd.
of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the applicant, a person
with a noticeable Filipino accent, met the qualifications for the position and his ac-
cent had no adverse effect on his supervisory duties); Bell v. Home Life Ins. Co., 596
F. Supp. 1549, 1555 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (stating that discrimination because of a for-
eign accent may constitute national origin discrimination); Xieng v. Peoples Nat'l
Bank, 844 P.2d 389, 391-92 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (holding that an employer vio-
lated a state law prohibition against national origin discrimination when he failed to
promote an employee because of the employee's foreign accent when the accent did
not materially interfere with the plaintiff's job performance); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.6(b)(1) (1995) (EEOC regulations declaring that discrimination based on an
individual's foreign accent may be national origin discrimination).
257 Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039 (citation omitted).
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tween his primary language and the culture that is derived from
his national origin. '258 The court distinguished its decision in
Jurado as turning on the business necessity of the rule rather
than the failure to establish a prima facie case.2 5 9
In the most recent decision to address the issue of private sec-
tor workplace English-only rules, the Ninth Circuit explicitly re-
jected the EEOC Guidelines and held that an English-only rule
applied to bilingual employees was not a per se violation of Title
VII. 26 ° In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., twenty-four out of a
workforce of thirty-three employees were Hispanic. Two em-
ployees could speak only Spanish, and the rest had varying levels
of English proficiency. The company promulgated a rule prohib-
iting the use of Spanish during working hours in response to
complaints that plaintiffs Garcia and Buitrago harassed and in-
sulted non-Spanish speaking employees in Spanish.26 1 The rule
stated:
[I]t is hereafter the policy of this Company that only English
will be spoken in connection with work. During lunch, breaks,
and employees' own time, they are obviously free to speak
Spanish if they wish. However, we urge all of you not to use
your fluency in Spanish in a fashion which may lead other em-
ployees to suffer humiliation.262
In addition to this policy, the company adopted a rule prohibiting
offensive racial, sexual, or personal remarks.
In response to a claim by two Hispanic employees that the
English-only rule had a disproportionate impact on their national
origin group, the court initially conceded that if the English-only
policy caused any adverse effects, such an impact would fall dis-
proportionately on the Hispanic employees.263 The court then
examined the employees' three arguments: (1) the policy denied
them the ability to express their cultural heritage at work; (2) it
denied them a privilege of employment enjoyed by monolingual
English-speaking employees; and (3) it created an atmosphere of
inferiority, isolation, and intimidation.264 Although the court
recognized that an individual's primary language provided "an
258 Id. (citation omitted).
259 Id. at 1041 & n.13.
260 Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, reh'g denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994).
261 Id. at 1483.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 1486.
264 Id. at 1486-87. Before beginning its analysis, the court noted that it was not
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important link to his ethnic culture and identity," the court deter-
mined that Title VII did not protect an employee's ability to ex-
press his cultural heritage at work because Title VII only
addresses "disparities in the treatment of workers." '265
Applying the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Garcia v. Gloor, the
court concluded that the rule had a significant adverse impact
only on those employees who possessed such limited English
skills that they were effectively denied the privilege of conversing
on the job. An employer may restrict the privilege of conversing
at work as long as members of a protected group are not denied
the privilege. In contrast, bilingual employees could engage in
conversation at work and were thus not adversely impacted since
"the language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a
particular time is ... a matter of choice."2" The court reasoned
that conversing at work was a privilege granted and defined at
the employer's discretion.267
Finally, the court refused to adopt the EEOC's per se rule that
English-only policies amount to a hostile or abusive working en-
vironment by creating an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and
intimidation. Instead, the plaintiff must prove that the policy has
a discriminatory effect before the burden shifts to the employer
to provide a business justification for the rule. The EEOC guide-
line contravened the established burdens of proof and ignored
the absence of legislative history to support a presumption of dis-
crimination. The court thus concluded that the plaintiffs failed to
make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.2 68
IV
DISPARATE IMPACr ANALYSIS OF ENGLISH-
ONLY RULES
Title VII is concerned with intentional discrimination as well
as employment practices and policies that lead to disparate treat-
ment of classes of employees. 269 Two theories of liability exist
for discrimination under Title VII: disparate treatment and dis-
bound by the reasoning in Gutierrez because it had been vacated as moot. Id. at
1487 n.1.
265 Id. at 1487.
266 Id. (quoting Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980)).
267 Id.
268 Id. at 1490.
269 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
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parate impact. 270 Disparate treatment requires proof of discrimi-
natory intent, while disparate impact focuses on the
consequences of the employment policy or practice rather than
the motivation.271
A. Disparate Impact
Although the EEOC and the courts analyze English-only rules
under the disparate impact theory, such a rule varies from the
typical facially neutral employment policy analyzed under the
theory. A facially neutral policy disqualifies members of the ma-
jority class as well as the protected minority class.272 For exam-
ple, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court stated that Title VII
"proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. ' 273 This opin-
ion implies that neutral selection devices such as a high school
diploma or general intelligence test disqualified Whites as well as
Blacks.274 Similarly, a height and weight requirement disquali-
fies both men and women. 275 In contrast, an English-only rule
never disqualifies a member of the majority class; no adverse im-
pact falls on individuals whose primary language is English.276
270 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-87 (1988).
271 Id. at 988; Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990); see
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). The court stated:
"Disparate treatment" ... is the most easily understood type of discrimina-
tion. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of dis-
criminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred
from the mere fact of differences in treatment.
Id.
272 See Perea, supra note 75, at 289-90.
273 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
2 74 
Id. at 427-28.
275 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
276 See Perea, supra note 75, at 290. Professor Perea argues that English-only
rules have been inaccurately characterized as facially neutral. Instead, they "should
be described as having an exclusive adverse impact that constitutes the 'functional
equivalent' of national origin discrimination." Id.; see also Owen M. Fiss, A Theory
of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 298-99 (1971). See generally
Marcus B. Chandler, Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact
Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 911, 923-24 (1979) (discussing Professor
Fiss' functional equivalence theory). While an individual whose primary language is
English might be restricted from using another language by such a rule, a relation-
ship between the secondary language and that individual's national origin would
likely not exist. Perea, supra note 75, at 290 n.151. Based on the "functional equiva-
lence" of primary language and national origin, Professor Perea concludes that an
employer must justify an English-only rule under the BFOQ defense rather than as a
business necessity. Id. at 295. Because the courts will continue to apply the dispa-
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The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided statutory guidelines for
the adjudication of disparate impact suits under Title VII in re-
sponse to a series of Supreme Court decisions which increased
the burden for victims of discrimination, and also provided puni-
tive and compensatory damages for ethnic minority discrimina-
tion if a claimant could not recover them under section 1981.277
Under the disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must first identify a
specific, seemingly neutral practice or policy that has a significant
adverse impact on members of a protected class.278 A plaintiff
must do more than merely raise an inference of discrimination;
the plaintiff "must actually prove the discriminatory impact at is-
sue." 279 In a disparate impact case in which a plaintiff alleges
that a selection criterion excludes protected applicants from jobs
or promotions, discriminatory impact is shown by statistical dis-
parities between the number of members of the protected class in
the qualified applicant pool and the number in the related seg-
ment of the workforce.28 ° Yet when the alleged disparate impact
is on the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, the
plaintiff must prove the existence of adverse effects of the policy,
that the impact of the policy is on conditions, terms, or privileges
of employment of the protected class, that the adverse effects are
significant, and that the employee population in general is not
affected by the policy to the same degree.2"'
Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the
employer to "demonstrate that the challenged practice is job re-
lated for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity. ' 282 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 changed the burden
rate impact analysis to such practices, English-only rules should be considered to
have an exclusive adverse impact, thus requiring a higher standard of business neces-
sity such as proving that the rule is the least discriminatory alternative. Id. at 290,
298.
277 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
278 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982); Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989).
279 Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990).
280 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-51; Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486.
281 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486.
282 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992). For criticism of the business
necessity standard because of its inconsistent application, see SCHLEI & GROSSMAN,
supra note 168, at 1328-29; George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII:
An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297, 1312 (1987)
("[D]isarray ... has resulted in the federal courts from uncertainty over what the
defense requires the defendant to prove."); Chandler, supra note 276, at 912
("[L]ower courts have been afforded a considerable degree of freedom in shaping
the contours of the defense."); see also Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d
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of proof scheme established in the Supreme Court's decision in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio 28 3 so that the burden of proof
shifted to the employer to prove that the employment policy or
practice was justified by a business necessity.284 The Court in
Wards Cove had changed the inquiry to a reasoned consideration
of the employer's asserted business justification .8 5  The em-
ployer merely had a burden of producing evidence of a business
justification, while the employee retained the burden of persua-
sion that the proferred justification was invalid, or demonstrating
the availability of less discriminatory alternative practices.286
Demonstrating a business necessity requires more than merely
asserting a convenience or preference.287 Instead, the policy or
practice must significantly and objectively serve the employer's
legitimate business purposes.288 Proof by the plaintiff of a less
discriminatory alternative eliminates the employer's
justification. 89
1267, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[C]ourts differ on just what an employer must prove
to discharge its burden.").
283 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 642.
284 See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2792-97 (1988)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
establish that the employment practice is a business necessity); Griggs, 401 U.S. at
432 ("Congress ... placed on the employer the burden of showing that [the chal-
lenged requirement bears] a manifest relationship to the employment in question."):
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (stating that employer is required to
"prove[ ] that the challenged requirements are job related").
285 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
286 Id. For a criticism of Wards Cove, see Perea, supra note 75, at 297-99.
287 See, e.g., Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (stating that a "mere insubstantial justi-
fication ... will not suffice"); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d
418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that "[m]anagement convenience and business ne-
cessity are not synonymous"); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th
Cir. 1979) (stating that "[aldministrative convenience is not a sufficient justification
for the employer's practices").
288 See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; Rutherglen, supra
note 282, at 1321; Chandler, supra note 276, at 934 ("The standard of job-relatedness
is an objective one .... [Olnly if the practice in fact serves business purposes can it
be deemed 'necessary'....").
289 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659-61; Rutherglen, supra note 282, at 1327 ("[I]f the
defendant has not considered an alternative . . . procedure with obviously greater
validity, then it has undermined the procedure that it did choose."); Perea, supra
note 75, at 300 ("If a plaintiff can show that less discriminatory alternatives exist that
would accomplish the employer's purpose equally well or more effectively with less
adverse impact, this proof undermines the justification for the employer's
practice.").
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B. Deference to the EEOC
When a statute is silent or ambiguous, a court will traditionally
defer to the interpretation by the agency responsible for enforc-
ing the Act when the interpretation is "based on a permissible
construction of the statute. ' 290 Thus, "no deference is due to
agency interpretations at odds with the plain language of the stat-
ute itself. Even contemporaneous and longstanding agency inter-
pretations must fall to the extent they conflict with statutory
language.'29
1
Applying this standard, the EEOC's interpretation is not al-
ways followed by the courts.292 The level of deference afforded
an EEOC interpretation of Title VII "'will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its rea-
soning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.' "293 An agency interpretation is entitled to
greater deference when Congress is aware of the interpretation
and chooses not to change it when amending the statute in other
respects.294
Based on these established criteria, the EEOC's guidelines on
English-only rules are entitled to substantial deference. Since
the adoption of the guidelines three years after the enactment of
Title VII, the EEOC has consistently held its position which has
been subjected to full notice and review. In fact, when Congress
amended Title VII in 1991 to clarify the standards for proving
disparate impact discrimination following the Court's decision in
Wards Cove, the Senate discussed the EEOC's guidelines and did
290 Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 185 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)); see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34 ("The administra-
tive interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great
deference.").
291 Betts, 492 U.S. at 171.
292 See, e.g., id. (rejecting EEOC view that a retirement system denying disability
retirement benefits to employees over 60 violated the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (rejecting the
EEOC's position on the plaintiff's burden of proof in a disparate treatment case);
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (rejecting EEOC determination that
discrimination against aliens was based on birth outside the United States and vio-
lated Title VII).
293 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (quoting General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141, 142 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
294 United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979).
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not alter them. 295 In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit incorrectly stated that the EEOC's
interpretation was not entitled to deference because it
"presum[ed] that an English-only policy has a disparate impact in
the absence of proof. ' 296 Applying its experience and carefully
reasoned analysis, the EEOC has correctly concluded that Eng-
lish-only rules invariably have a disparate impact on national ori-
gin minority groups. In contrast to its position in Spun Steak, the
Ninth Circuit recently recognized in another context that lan-
guage is a close proxy for national origin and that such rules have
an adverse impact which falls almost exclusively upon Hispanics
and other national origin minorities.297
C. Business Justifications
Employers have asserted that English-only rules promote ra-
cial harmony by reducing racial tension and fear on the part of
customers and fellow employees. 98 In support of the rules, em-
ployers have expressed the concern of customers and other em-
ployees that Spanish was being used for rude or insubordinate
remarks. 299 Rather than assuaging these fears by promoting ra-
295 On the floor of the Senate, Senator DeConcini stated that many of his constit-
uents had complained about English-only rules in the workplace, and he asked Sena-
tor Kennedy, a sponsor of the legislation amending Title VII, whether the EEOC's
guidelines would continue in effect. Senator Kennedy replied that the guidelines had
been effective and that the new legislation would not affect their validity. 137 CONG.
Rnc. S15,489 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
296 Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490, reh'g denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994).
297 Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217, 1241-42 (9th Cir.
1994), reh'g granted, 53 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1995).
298 See, e.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483; Gutierrez v.Municipal Court of S.E.
Judicial Dist., 838 F.2d 1031, 1042 (claiming that the rule reduced disruptions by
"prevent[ing] the workplace from turning into a 'Tower of Babel"'); Garcia v. Gloor,
618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); Hernandez v.
Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Or. 1973) (prohibiting Spanish necessary due
to fear that Chicanos were talking about White customers); EEOC Dec. No. 81-25,
27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820. 1821 (1981) (other employees and customers
objected to Spanish conversations between co-workers); see also Perea, supra note
75, at 302 n.224 (asserting that this racial tension and fear is more properly charac-
terized as "cultural, linguistic, or ethnic tension").299 See Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Medical Ctr., 775 F. Supp. 338 (C.D.
Cal. 1991). In response to complaints from other nurses that Filipina nurses, includ-
ing Ms. Dimaranan, were speaking in Tagalog, the native language of the Philip-
pines, the Head Nurse warned them not to speak Tagalog. Id. at 341. The court
found that an English-only rule did not exist since Spanish could be spoken and the
rule restricting the use of Tagalog was shift specific. Id. at 345. In addition, the
court determined that legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons existed for the rule be-
[Vol. 74, 19951
Nativism and Workplace Language Restrictions
cial harmony, English-only rules actually increase racial tension
in the workplace.3"' In Dimoranan v. Pomona Valley Hospital
Medical Center, an expert witness testified that language restric-
tions merely shift the sense of tension from the monolingual to
the multilingual group, and described another hospital which
eliminated such a restriction and replaced it with a course in
cross cultural communication and cultural diversity training,
which resulted in increased employee morale.3"' Evidence in
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of Southeast Judicial District indi-
cated that the working atmosphere substantially deteriorated as a
result of an English-only rule; racial animosity increased between
Hispanics and non-Spanish speaking employees, Hispanics felt
belittled by the rule, and Hispanic employees were subjected to a
series of discriminatory remarks. 30 2 Rather than implementing
an English-only rule to prevent rude or insubordinate comments,
an employer could prohibit such comments in all languages and
then discipline any offending employees. While it would be more
difficult to discipline an employee making comments in a lan-
guage not understood by the employer, this difficulty does not
justify a broad language restriction.
In addition, an asserted justification is that English-only rules
promote the use of English.30 3 While promoting English may be
a goal of state statutes declaring English the official state lan-
guage, such a justification fails to fulfill the requirement for a
business necessity of significantly serving an employer's legiti-
mate business purpose.30 4 The employer must demonstrate that
cause of the tension on a disorganized floor: "It is clear that management was not
primarily concerned with the use of Tagalog, but rather with the breakdown of cohe-
sion [in] the ... unit and the effect of dissension upon the well-being and safety of
mothers and their newborns." Id. at 344; see also Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483;
Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042-43; Gloor, 618 F.2d at 267.
300 See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042-43; Hernandez, 368 F. Supp. at 754 (tavern
owner's prohibition of foreign languages led to racial tension and assaults upon His-
panic customers).
301 Imahara & Kim, supra note 10, at 117, n.41, 121. See also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.7(a) (1995) (stating that prohibiting employees from speaking their primary
language may create an "atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation based
on national origin"); Perea, supra note 75, at 303 (describing such fears as "exactly
the kind of stereotyped judgments that Title VII was designed to eliminate").
302 Ugalde, supra note 3, at 1226 nn.106-07.
303 Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042 (employer argued that the rule was required by a
state statute making English the official state language); Gloor, 618 F.2d at 267 (em-
ployer claimed that the rule would improve the employees' fluency in English).
304 Cf. Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 371 (4th Cir. 1980) (plu-
rality opinion), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981) ("If this personal compassion [for
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improving the employees' fluency in English relates to a specific
business purpose rather than a general societal goal. 30 5 In the
event an employer truly wished to increase English fluency in the
workforce, a less discriminatory alternative would be to offer in-
centives or classes to employees.
Employers have also claimed that the rules are necessary to
enhance worker safety and product quality. 30 6 Although safety
and efficiency are established grounds for a business necessity,
the employer must still demonstrate that the rule is necessary
due to workplace hazards in order to prevent accidents and dur-
ing an emergency.30 7 The employer would be required to
pregnant stewardesses] can be attributed to corporate policy it is commendable, but
in the area of civil rights, personal ... decisions not affecting business operations are
best left to individuals who are the targets of discrimination."); Dothard, 433 U.S. at
331 n.14 (stating that statute did not establish a business justification in a sexual
discrimination context); see also Perea, supra note 75, at 306.
305 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 ("If an employment practice cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited .... [A]ny given requirement
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question."); Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he challenged practice must
effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve.") (footnote omitted);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating that
the criteria must be "an irresistible demand" of the job); see also SCHLEI & GROSS-
MAN, supra note 168, at 359 (criteria must be reasonably necessary for job
performance).
306 See, e.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483 ("[E]mployees who did not understand
Spanish claimed that the use of Spanish distracted them while they were operating
machinery, ... [and] the U.S.D.A. inspector.., spoke only English and thus could
not understand if a product-related concern was raised in Spanish."); Saucedo v.
Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 921 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (English-only rule
necessary during drilling of an oil well); EEOC Dec. No. 83-7, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide
(CCH) 6836 (1983) (stating that English-only rule is necessary for effective com-
munication during emergencies and to prevent and control dangers in a refinery).
307 See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 n.14: Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730
F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1984); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways. Inc., 649 F.2d 670,
676-77 (9th Cir. 1980); Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 666-68 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d
1367, 1374, 1379-81 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); Davis v.
County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated, 440 U.S. 625
(1979); see also Maclennan v. American Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466, 472 (E.D.
Va. 1977) ("[T]he incantation of a safety rationale is not an abracadabra to which [a]
[clourt must defer judgment."); Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 108 (1974). For an
example of an acceptable policy under the EEOC guidelines, see EEOC Dec. 83-7,
31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1861 n.2 (1983): "To insure safe and efficient opera-
tions in the .. .Refinery terminal, laboratory and processing areas; and to insure
that instructions are understandable and accurately communicated, all employees
are required to speak only English while performing their job duties. Furthermore,
during emergency conditions all refinery employees shall speak only English." The
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demonstrate that the rule actually and effectively contributed in
a significant manner to improved safety and efficiency.3 °8 Yet in
many circumstances, this asserted justification supports an Eng-
lish-proficiency requirement rather than a language restriction.30 9
V
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND
NATIONAL ORIGIN
As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Yniguez and Spun Steak, a
monolingual individual can not make a choice between commu-
nicating in one language or another.310 Communication by that
individual can only occur in a single language which may not be
English. However, even for bilingual individuals, language pro-
vides an important link to an individual's ethnic culture and iden-
tity.311 For members of language minority groups as well as
many other Americans, "speech is an indicator of cultural iden-
tity second in importance only to physical appearance. Further,
accent, language choice, verbal style, choice of words, phrases,
and gestures act as a primary vehicle for creative expression by
individuals and by groups. ' 312 A prohibition against the use of
non-English languages ignores the fact that language choice is
not merely a mode of communication; the chosen language is it-
self a form of communication conveying meaning and nuance
through the selection of words, tone, social and cultural refer-
ences, and expression of values.313
EEOC concluded that the rule was narrowly drawn for the "purpose of assuring
effective communication . . . during specified times and in specified areas where the
potential [existed for] fires, explosions and other casualties ... ." Id. at 1862.
308 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989); Perea, supra
note 75, at 315.
309 See, e.g., Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 660 F.2d 1217,
1222 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that virtually every position in a hospital required the
ability to speak and read some English). A requirement that employees be fluent in
English violates Title VII if it has no relationship to the job or if it purposefully
discriminates against individuals of a particular national origin; see also Frontera v.
Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1975); Mejia v. New York Sheraton Hotel, 459 F.
Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
310 Yniguez v. Arizonans For Official English, 42 F.3d 1217, 1231 n.17 (9th Cir.
1994), reh'g granted, 53 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1995); Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d
1480, 1488, reh'g denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726
(1994).
311 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487.
312 CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 30, at 279.
313 See Joshua A. Fishman, The Sociology of Language: An Interdisciplinary So-
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[P]revailing mainstream attitudes deny any relationship be-
tween language and culture, arguing that revocation of lan-
guage rights in no way compromises the integrity of cultural
freedoms upon which our nation was constituted. Paradoxi-
cally, while language is generally viewed as nothing but a
means of communication, standard English is held up as the
only appropriate embodiment of the national character.31 4
Courts such as the Fifth Circuit in Garcia presuppose that lan-
guage and ethnic culture are not related by concluding that lan-
guage restrictions do not interfere with ethnic identity or cultural
expression.315 Yet studies by sociology and sociolinguistic schol-
ars refute this conclusion regarding language and ethnicity.316
Ethnicity encompasses "both the sense and the expression of
'collective, intergenerational cultural continuity,' i.e. the sensing
and expressing of links to 'one's own kind (one's own peo-
ple)."'' 317 The term ethnicity implies a sense of attachment to a
group, a sense of "peoplehood. ' '318 Scholars of language and
ethnicity recognize language as a fundamental expression of an
individual's cultural ethnicity.319 For Hispanic individuals, as
cial Science Approach to Language in Society, in 1 ADVANCES IN THE SOCIOLOGY
OF LANGUAGE, 217, 219 (Joshua Fishman ed., 1971).
314 CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 30, at 279.
315 See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 449 U.S.
1113 (1981) (determining that "[n]either [Title VII] nor common understanding
equates national origin with the language that one chooses to speak").
316 See Perea, supra note 75, at 276.
317 Mother-Tongue Claiming in the United States Since 1960, supra note 20, at 4.
318 MILTON GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE 23 (1964); see also
Michael Novak, Cultural Pluralism for Individuals: A Social Vision, in PLURALISM
IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 25, 29-34 (Melvin Tumin & Walter Plotch eds., 1977)
(on various definitions of ethnicity).
319 See Mother-Tongue Claiming in the United States Since 1960, supra note 20, at
70-71:
Ethnicity is ... belonging or pertaining to a phenomenologically complete,
separate, historically deep cultural collectivity, a collectivity polarized on
perceived authenticity. This "belonging" is experienced and interpreted
physically (biologically), behaviorally (culturally) and phenomenologically
(intuitively) .... [C]haracterized as it is on all three [levels] it is a very
mystic, moving and powerful link with the past and an energizer with re-
spect to the present and tuture. It is fraught with moral imperatives, with
obligations to "one's own kind," and with wisdoms, rewards and proprie-
ties that are both tangible and intangible .... As such, it is language-re-
lated to a very high and natural degree, both overtly (imbedded as it is in
verbal culture and implying as it does structurally dependent intuitions)
and covertly (the supreme symbol system [language] quintessentially sym-
bolizes its users and distinguishes between them and others). Indeed this is
so to such a degree that language and ethnic authenticity may come to be
viewed as highly interdependent.
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well as other closely-knit ethnic groups, language and culture in-
tertwine to both reflect and shape the individual's reality.320 The
connection between national origin and language has also been
recognized by many legal scholars. 321 The continuing vitality of
non-English language newspapers, as well as radio and television
broadcasts, reflects this strong bond between an individual's na-
tive language and cultural identity.322 The important relationship
between language and ethnicity is also recognized and preserved
in the approximately 6600 non-English language schools in the
See also Fishman, supra note 313, at 219 ("[Language] is not merely a carrier of
content, whether latent, or manifest. Language itself is content, a referent for loyal-
ties and animosities, an indicator of social statuses and personal relationships, a
marker of situations and topics as well as of the societal goals and the large-scale
value-laden arenas of interaction that typify every speech community."); CONKLIN &
LOURIE, supra note 30, at 279 ("[Flor many Americans, speech is an indicator of
cultural identity second in importance only to physical appearance. Further, accent,
language choice, verbal style, choice of words, phrases, and gestures act as a primary
vehicle for creative expression by individuals and by groups."); Karst, supra note 8,
at 308 n.20 ("'[Elthnicity' and 'ethnic identity' ... refer to one's connection with a
group defined by the sharing of one or more of a number of overlapping traits such
as ancestral origins, race, religion, language, and culture.").
320 Jane Macnab Christian & Chester C. Christian. Jr., Spanish Language and Cul-
ture in the Southwest, in LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 280, 300
(Joshua Fishman ed., 1966). See also Gloor. 618 F.2d at 267 (expert testimony iden-
tifying "Spanish language [as] the most important aspect of ethnic identification for
Mexican-Americans").
321 See, e.g., Perea, supra note 75, at 276 ("Primary language, like accent, is
closely correlated and inextricably linked with national origin.") (footnote omitted);
McDougal, et al., supra note 28, at 152 ("[L]anguage is commonly taken as a prime
indicator of an individual's group identifications.") (footnote omitted); Cutler, supra
note 11, at 1165 ("Differences in dress, language, accent, and custom associated with
a non-American origin are more likely to elicit prejudicial attitudes than the fact of
the origin itself.") (footnote omitted); Domengeaux, supra note 73, at 1167 ("Lan-
guage is the lifeblood of every ethnic group. To economically and psychologically
penalize a person for practicing his native tongue is to strike at the core of ethnic-
ity."); Piatt, supra note 135, at 898-901; Note, Official English, supra note 45, at
1355; Karst, supra note 8, at 351-57.
322 Mother-Tongue Claiming in the United States Since 1960, supra note 20, at 224,
344-45 (From 1960 to 1980, the number of non-English newspapers and radio and
television services significantly increased. During that time period, the number of
Spanish language publications rose from 49 to 165; and by 1982, 275 television sta-
tions devoted at least part of the day to non-English programming); see also Nathan
Glazer, The Process and Problems of Language-Maintenance: An Integrative Re-
view, in A PLURALISTIC NATION: THE LANGUAGE ISSUE IN THE UNITED STATES 33
(Margaret A. Laurie & Nancy Faires Conklin eds., 1978) ("In America, the immi-
grant wants to preserve, as far as possible, his heritage from the old country. These
[sic] are represented preeminently by his language and his religion. At the same
time, he wants to participate in the common life and find a place in the American
community. In these two motives, we have at once the problem of the foreign-lan-
guage press and its solution.") (citation omitted).
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United States, which are "unequivocally committed to the view
that their particular language and ethnicity linkage is vital and,
hopefully, eternal. '323
The inextricable connection between language and ethnicity
also exists for bilingual individuals.324 The primary language pro-
vides bilingual individuals with associations and notions of fam-
ily, friendship, and intimacy.325 The EEOC guidelines recognize
this connection by noting that it is "common for individuals
whose primary language is not English to inadvertently change
from speaking English to speaking their primary language. "326
While bilingualism is often defined as the ability "to speak two
languages with nearly equal facility, ' 327 bilingualism should be
considered "as a spectrum of abilities in a second language rang-
ing from minimal ability to communicate in a second language to
equal facility in two languages."'32  The Ninth Circuit's analysis
in Spun Steak mistakenly assumed that bilingual employees are
"fluent in both English and Spanish. ' 329 This assumption ignores
323 Mother-Tongue Claiming in the United States Since 1960, supra note 20, at 365.
The majority of these schools teach in Spanish, Hebrew, Yiddish, Greek, and Penn-
sylvania German. Id. at 242.
324 Perea, supra note 75, at 279. But cf. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270 (1981) (reasoning
that "the language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a particular time
is by definition a matter of choice." The court also concluded that the English-only
rule "did not forbid cultural expression to persons for whom compliance with it
might impose hardship.").
325 Fishman, supra note 313, at 251 (noting that Spanish-speaking bilinguals pri-
marily associate their native Spanish language with the intimacy value cluster of
family and friendship); Lawrence Greenfield, Situational Measures of Normative
Language Views in Relation to Person, Place and Topic Among Puerto Rican Bil-
inguals, in 2 ADVANCES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 17, 33 (Joshua Fishman
ed., 1972) ("Use of Spanish was claimed primarily in the domain of family, seconda-
rily for the domains of friendship and religion, and least of all in those of education
and employment, while the reverse held true for English.").
326 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c) (1995).
327 Perea, supra note 75, at 292 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY
133 (1972)).
328 Id. Although not immutable in the same sense as the personal characteristics
of race, color, or sex protected under Title VII, Professor Perea contends that for
many individuals primary language is "practically immutable" based on the difficulty
for adults of acquiring a second language, especially when they are members of a
language minority group. Perea, supra note 75, at 280; see John H. Schumann, Sec-
ond Language Acquisition: The Pidginization Hypothesis, in SECOND LANGUAGE
AcoUIsrriON: A BOOK OF READINGS 256 (Evelyn Mascussen Hatch ed., 1978); Rina
G. Shapira, The Non-learning of English: Case Study of an Adult, in SECOND LAN-
GUAGE ACoUISITION, supra, at 246 (both presenting case studies of Spanish-speak-
ing adults' difficulty in learning English).
329 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487.
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the range of language proficiency levels in individuals identified
as bilingual. While most first-generation adult immigrants ac-
quire some level of functional bilingualism, only a few become
truly fluent in English.33 ° Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Garcia
incorrectly viewed a bilingual individual's choice of language as a
matter of personal preference.33' Individuals who acquire a sec-
ond language often speak either English or their native language
as circumstances warrant, alternating between languages in what
is linguistically termed "code-switching. '332 Thus, an English-
only rule severely restricts a person with limited English profi-
ciency as well as an individual with equal facility in two languages
in his or her ability to communicate.333
CONCLUSION
Our nation "has historically prided itself on welcoming immi-
grants with a spirit of tolerance and freedom," including those
who speak a language other than English.334 Yet during periods
of economic and social turmoil, the Statue of Liberty's torch has
dimmed, no longer providing a beacon of welcome to the world's
immigrants. At such times, a shadow of discrimination and dis-
trust is cast over the nation's ethnic minority groups, citizens and
legal immigrants alike. The official English movement and the
simultaneous increase in English-only rules in the workplace pro-
vide the most recent examples of the xenophobia and discrimina-
tory policies directed at language minorities. The international
community and the United States have recognized the oppres-
sion associated with language restrictions, ratifying Article 27 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
provides: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be
denied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their
330 See CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 30, at 160.
331 See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270.
332 See CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 30, at 161-62 (Code-switching permits the
individual to effectively communicate in the language that most accurately conveys
the idea).
333 See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270 ("To a person who speaks only one tongue or to a
person who has difficulty using another language than the one spoken in his home,
language might well be an immutable characteristic like skin color, sex or place of
birth.").
334 Yniguez, 42 F.3d at 1242.
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own religion, or to use their own language." '335 Despite the overt
negation of protected rights by language restrictions, the
Supreme Court will likely conclude that the prohibition against
national origin discrimination does not include English-only rules
in light of the Court's propensity towards strict construction of
civil rights statutes.336
A tension exists between the melting pot metaphor, in which
cultural traits and ethnic differences are eliminated through as-
similation into a homogeneous American identity with predomi-
nately Anglo characteristics, and the rich traditions preserved by
cultural pluralism, in which cultural traits add to the richness of
the American experience. As Justice Douglas wrote: "The melt-
ing pot is not designed to homogenize people, making them uni-
form in consistency .... [Rather, it] depicts the wide diversities
tolerated .. .under one flag." '337 The language conformity en-
forced through an English-only policy has a direct and negative
impact on members of language minority groups. Rather than
allowing xenophobia and nativism to provide support for forced
cultural assimilation, the diverse and multicultural character of
our society should be recognized and celebrated as one of our
nation's greatest strengths.
335 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, T.S. No.
14,668, at 179.
336 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 612
(1992) ("However uneven the Court was in protecting individual liberties through
statutory interpretation in the 1970s, it was significantly less protective in the
1980s."); Charles B. Craver, Radical Supreme Court Justices Endeavor to Rewrite the
Civil Rights Statutes, 10 THE LABOR LAWYER 727, 728 (1994) ("[The] five-Justice
conservative bloc ... was intent on restructuring the employment discrimination
laws.").
337 Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 334 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). By
forcing conformity and assimilation, individuals feel a sense of inferiority and stig-
matization. See Karst, supra note 8, at 324-25 ("The pressure to conform carries
with it an implication that members of the unorthodox cultural group are inferior.
Correspondingly, the subordination of a cultural group ... undermines confidence in
the group's values and perspectives, with the long-term effect of impairing the per-
ceived worth of the group's ethnic identity .. ") (footnote omitted).
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